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Abstract: Latin America is a region whose critical social imagination has stalled, changing from a 
uniquely prolific period during the 1950s and 1960s — revolving around structuralism, ‘dependency’, 
Baran and Sweezy-type analysis of ‘monopoly capitalism’, French structuralism, the German 
Historical School, Keynesian and Post-Keynesian macroeconomics, and the ideas of endogenous 
intellectuals (such as Mariátegui) — to an intellectually barren one since the 1982 debt-crisis and the 
fall of the Berlin Wall.  Although this has happened in most of the world, the downswing of the cycle 
of critical thinking and the process of re-legitimisation of capital have been more pronounced in Latin 
America, as neo-liberalism has conquered the region, including most of its progressive intelligentsia, 
just as completely (and just as fiercely) as the Holy Inquisition conquered Spain — transforming 
critical thinkers into an endangered species.  A key problem of the pre-1980 critical social 
imagination had been its unremitting critique of the economy; consequently, once the ‘new left’ 
conceded the economy as the fundamental hub of the struggle, there seemed to have been little else 
left in terms of basic ideological principles to hold onto in a thoughtful way.  It was as if ‘progressive’ 
thinking had lost not just some but all its relevance — making it very difficult to move forward 
ideologically in a creative way.  As a result, in terms of development strategies and economic policies 
both the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ left are still mostly stuck in the past: while the former (as in Venezuela) 
tries to recreate somewhat mechanically what it perceives to be ‘the best of the past’, the latter 
(except for their policies on social expenditure) attempts to create a future which is fundamentally 
the exact opposite of that past (e.g., the ‘new-left’ in Brazil and Chile) — and in order to do so, it 
seems to have only one guiding economic policy principle: to transform practically everything that 
before was considered “virtue” into a “vice”, and “vice” into a “virtue”.  Not surprisingly, neither 
approach has been very successful; in the case of the latter, their remarkably narrow ‘reverse-gear’ 
attitude has delivered not only a disappointing economic performance (especially in terms of 
productivity-growth), but also a political settlement characterised by a rather odd mixture of an 
insatiable oligarchy, a captured ‘progressive’ political élite (the dominant classes are quite happy to 
let them govern as long as they don’t forget who they are), ‘sterilised’ governments, passive citizens, 
and a stalled social imagination — all made more palatable for the poor by an agenda of safety-nets.  
From time to time, this dull mélange is sparked off by outbursts of students’ discontent.  Meanwhile, 
the world (with its new technological and institutional paradigms) moves on, and Asia forges ahead.  
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Domination is more effective if it delegates the [...]  
violence on which it rests to the dominated. 
Theodor Adorno 
 
We welcome illusions because they spare us emotional distress [...]. 
We must not complain, then, if now and again they come into collision  
with some portion of reality and are shattered against it. 
 
In reality our fellow-citizens have not sunk so low as we feared,  
because they had never risen so high as we believed. 
Sigmund Freud 
 
 
 
1.-  Introduction: The Latin American critical tradition in political economy  
Discussing Say’s Law, Keynes once said that Ricardo had conquered England as 
completely as the Holy Inquisition conquered Spain.  Something similar has happened in 
post-1980 Latin America (LA), where neo-liberalism has conquered the region, including 
most of its progressive intelligentsia, just as completely (and just as fiercely) as the Holy 
Inquisition conquered Spain.  In fact, this process has been so successful that it has 
actually had the effect of ‘closing the imagination’ to conceptualising feasible 
alternatives.  As a result, not even the (relatively small) Latin American left that has so 
far resisted the neo-liberal tsunami has been able to generate a new (post-structuralism/ 
post-dependency) tradition of critical thought.  Hence, the neo-liberal slogan “there is no 
alternative” (TINA) has become one of the most effective self-fulfilling prophecies of all 
time.  
LA is a region whose critical social imagination has stalled, changing from a 
uniquely prolific period during the 1950s and 1960s to an intellectually barren one since 
the death of Allende, the appointment of Paul Volker at the FED, the election of Thatcher 
and Reagan, the 1982 debt crisis, and the fall of the Berlin Wall.  Of course, it could be 
argued that what happened in LA is not really that different from what has happened in 
the rest of the world post-1980, both developed and developing.  One could even argue 
that (despite recent sparks of interest in ever-more obscene levels of inequality)2, the 
recent demise of critical thinking has spread around the world almost as a pandemic — 
transforming critical thinkers into an endangered species (see Arantes, 2007).  However, 
in LA the downswing of this cycle of critical thinking seems to have been particularly 
pronounced.   
These phenomena bring to light issues related to what may be needed for the 
sustainability of intellectual traditions, and in particular of their capacity for continuous 
critical thinking.  
The emergence in LA after the Second World War of a creative intellectual 
tradition in the social sciences somehow runs against what one could call the ‘Iberian 
tradition’.  This tradition has been far more creative in painting, sculpture, music, 
theatre, literature and film than in its contributions to the social sciences.  Basically, in 
                                      
2  See especially Piketty (2014); see also Palma (2011 and 2014).   
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the Iberian Peninsula and in LA social sciences have suffered as a result of a lack of 
“enlightenment” beyond the arts and letters, and, more specifically, because of the lack 
of sophistication in the exercise of power by the state.  Here the ideas of Foucault are 
crucial to an understanding of this issue. One of Foucault’s main points in this respect 
was that knowledge and power are interrelated, one presupposing the other (see 
Foucault, 1980).  Aside from its philosophical dimension, Foucault’s idea intended to 
show how the development of social sciences was interrelated with the deployment of 
‘modern’ forms of power.  These needed to be exercised with a much more fine-grained 
knowledge of society and of forms of domination.  The modern state required the 
development of the social sciences to find more sophisticated forms of ‘disciplining’ 
individuals and groups; that is, more sophisticated forms of knowledge were required for 
more sophisticated technologies of power.3  
In the ‘Iberian world’, since states have often governed through remarkably ‘un-
modern’ means, and at times via crudely mediated forms, they have required a much 
lower level of development of the social knowledge, and less sophistication in their forms 
of control.  And as these states have had no objective necessity for the advancement of 
this knowledge, they have not developed the institutions that were necessary for 
acquiring it.  As a result, social sciences have been relegated to a relatively marginalised 
academic enterprise.  In other words, the ‘Iberian world’, lacking the objective 
incentives, has not generated in their social sciences the remarkable creativity found (in 
its past and present) in its paintings, sculptures, music, theatre, literature or films.  As in 
the distant past the “Siglo de Oro”, with its flourishing arts and literature, had no 
counterpart in the social sciences, the recent past is no different.4  Basically, where is 
the Picasso of Ibero-American economics?  The García Lorca of its political sciences?  The 
García Márquez of its sociology?  The César Vallejo of its economic history?  The 
Almodóvar of its social anthropology?  The Fernando Pessoa of its human geography?  
The Frida Kahlo of its social psychology?  Or the Neruda of its political philosophy?   
Another (complementary) input to the understanding of the lack of development of 
LA’s social sciences is revealed by Ortega y Gasset.  He once referred to LA’s “[...] 
narcissistic tendency to use reality as a mirror for self-contemplation, rather than as a 
subject for critical analysis and progress” (1918).  He also observed that in LA he found 
too many “self-satisfied individuals”, reminding us that “[...] human history is the 
product of discontent” (Ibid.).  Not surprisingly, these regional characteristics have not 
been very conducive to the development of the social sciences.   
A very good example of this (not very creative) attitude in the social sciences — 
the use of reality as a mirror for self-contemplation — is provided by a good deal of 
mainstream economics in the region.  Another example of this attitude is given by the 
well-known fact that in LA individuals are often more interested in wealth as a mean to 
demonstrate publicly their personal status, and as a sign of power and influence, rather 
                                      
3  For a discussion of Foucault’s ideas in the context of the Arab world, see Frangie (2008).  
4  Another Ibero-American cultural ‘forte’ is law, although — as opposed to the arts and letters — 
this has often been so for the wrong reasons.  Given the importance of a rather inefficient 
administrative apparatuses, the omnipresence of law professionals in the middle and upper middle 
strata, and the channelling of much political and policy debate through legal and constitutional 
debates/reforms, has been another trait of Ibero-American culture.   
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than as a means of capitalist-type accumulation and transformation (à-la Schumpeter); 
this phenomenon has been an important fetter on the economic development of the 
region.  
In fact, the unusual dynamism of LA’s social sciences after the Second World War 
had as an important input the impact of a recent non-Iberian European immigration.  
This immigration was in general different from previous ones in that it comprised a large 
number of intellectuals, including many Jewish academics escaping Nazi persecution.  
Another input was given by members of second or third generation immigrant families 
from the ‘Axis powers’ — particularly Italians — who (probably disgusted by the 
obscenities of fascism), instead of joining ‘the family business’, chose a life of intellectual 
work.  Some cumulative causation was probably also at play, where (as opposed to 
what’s happening today) a vibrant intellectual life of the critical thinking-type generated 
powerful ‘pull factors’.  Finally, another crucial contribution was provided by the rise in 
many countries of a more endogenous ‘mestizo’ class, struggling to transform white-
Iberian dominated pre-capitalist societies.  The writings of Mariátegui probably best 
reflect this phenomenon (see Mariátegui, 1928).  His main message was that social 
transformation should evolve organically on the basis of local conditions and practices, 
not as the result of mechanically applying European formulae.  This, of course, is also 
extremely relevant to the issue of the sustainability of an intellectual tradition.  As will be 
argued below, the lack of sufficiently strong endogenous roots in Latin American critical 
thinking explains in part why it moved so easily in tandem with ideological and political 
changes elsewhere, particularly in Western and Eastern Europe.   
 
2.-  The Emergence of structuralism and dependency analyses  
After the Second World War, the Latin American critical tradition in the social sciences 
revolved around two axes, structuralism and ‘dependency analyses’.  Although there was 
an important degree of diversity in them, one crucial characteristic of these intellectual 
traditions was that they were associated with a growing regional consciousness of 
‘under-development’ — i.e., a growing realisation that from an evolutionary point of 
view, LA was not progressing along the expected developmental path that would bring 
the countries of the region closer to the socio-political and economic structures of more 
industrialised countries.  So, the general feeling was that instead of properly ‘catching-
up’, LA was getting increasingly trapped in a sort of evolutionary blind alley.  For 
structuralists, to escape this fate what was needed was to engineer a very specific set of 
structural changes in the economies of the region that would help revitalise them by 
fostering those economic activities with the externalities and the spill-over effects 
needed to set in motion processes of cumulative causation that would take advantage of 
dynamic economies of scale, increasing returns and so on.  And for ‘dependentistas’, 
instead, what was needed was to turn LA politically in a radically new direction.  That is, 
structuralists called for a new economic structure, with a leading agency rôle for the 
state and the emerging industrial bourgeoisie in how to get there, while ‘dependentistas’ 
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were more concerned with a new form of agency from the left in the form of a more 
visionary and radical political leadership.5   
However, as already mentioned, an important characteristic of these new critical 
traditions was that those most involved in them were rather ‘semi-detached’ from 
endogenous socio-political movements and organisations.  In fact, it is no accident that 
one of its most creative sources (structuralism) developed, of all places, among UN 
bureaucrats (ECLAC), and was led by an ex-president of a central bank (Raúl Prebisch); 
and that in the other (dependency) one of its most influential branches was set in motion 
by someone recently graduated, of all places, from the Faculty of Economics of the 
University of Chicago (Andre Gunder Frank).  That is, these intellectual traditions, 
because of their rather superficial rooting in endogenous socio-political movements, did 
not have many ‘organic intellectuals’ (in a Gramscian sense). 
 
2.1 -  Structuralism — and the limits of the economics of “Uneven 
Development” 
The dimensions of ECLAC’s thought were based not only upon its structuralist nature, but 
also upon its breadth and internal unity (see Appendix 1).  Nevertheless, it is also in this 
structuralist nature that the limitations of ECLAC thought lie.  ECLAC proposed an ideal 
model of sectoral growth designed in such a way that the three structural tendencies 
identified by their analyses (unemployment, external disequilibrium, and the tendency 
towards deterioration of the terms of trade) could be avoided (see Appendix 1).  From 
this was derived the necessary conditions of accumulation to allow the required 
transformation of the different sectors of material production.  However, this type of 
structuralist approach is insufficient for the analysis of the evolution of the system as a 
whole, as it clearly involves more than the transformation of the structure of production 
in one of its poles.  The theories of ECLAC examined certain aspects of the development 
of the forces of production (to the extent that they deal with labour productivity and the 
degree of diversification and homogeneity of the structures of production), but did not 
touch on social relations of production or the nature of the state, nor, as a result, on the 
manner in which they interact.  
Furthermore, the analysis of the asymmetries of development in the world 
economy cannot be carried out solely in terms of the patterns of accumulation necessary 
to avoid the creation of certain disproportions between the different sectors of material 
production, as these are clearly linked to the nature of accumulation in each pole.6  That 
is, it is not enough to postulate the unevenness of development of the forces of 
production; it is necessary also to bear in mind that those forces of production develop in 
the framework of a process of generation, appropriation and utilisation of the economic 
                                      
5  Those who made influential contributions in the structuralist camp include (among many others) 
Ahumada, Bacha, Díaz-Alejandro, Fajnzylber, French-Davis, Furtado, Katz, Noyola, Pinto, Prebisch, 
Rodríguez, Sunkel and Urquidi; while in dependency analyses they include (again, among many 
others) Caputo, Cardoso, Dos Santos, Faletto, Hinkelammert, Laclau, Lessa, Marini, Pizarro, Serra 
and Tavares.   
6  For further analyses of these issue, see Rodríguez (2006); Cimoli and Porcile (2014); and Palma 
(1978 and 2008a).   
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surplus, and that process, and the relations of exploitation upon which it is based, are 
not reproduced purely within each pole, but also between the two poles of the world 
economy.   
In other words, in ECLAC’s work one finds a huge analytical gap between their 
abstract 'structural' analysis, and the actual feasibility/effectiveness of their down-to-
earth concrete set of policy recommendations.  This gap emerged from their failure to 
analyse national/regional distributions of power properly, as well as their formal and 
informal socio-political institutional and organisational evolution and characteristics — 
which is essential in order to be able to ‘translate’ effectively their abstract ‘structuralist’ 
(or system) analysis into a pragmatic set of effective policy recommendations.  That is, 
what was lacking in their analyses was an understanding of the political settlements in 
which their policy-recommendations were supposed to be applied.7   
It is not particularly surprising that ECLAC should have attracted its share of 
criticism, particularly as it went beyond purely theoretical analysis to offer a package of 
heterodox policy recommendations.  From the right the reaction was immediate and at 
times ferocious: ECLAC’s policy recommendations were totally heretical, and threatened 
the interests of powerful domestic and foreign groups.  ECLAC was also criticised from 
sections of the left for failing to denounce sufficiently the mechanisms of exploitation 
within the capitalist system, and for criticising the conventional theory of international 
trade only from ‘within’.  
On the political front, the right also accused ECLAC of being the ‘Trojan horse of 
Marxism’ on the strength of the degree of coincidence between the two analyses.  In 
both cases the principal obstacle was located overseas (international division of labour 
imposed by the centre), and they shared the conviction that without a strenuous effort 
to remove the internal obstacles to development — in particular, the traditional sectors 
and the weakness of a typically ‘captured’ state — the processes of industrialisation and 
of renewal of domestic agriculture, and the necessary political and social 
transformations, would be greatly impeded.  
Furthermore, the coincidences between the two respective lines of thought were 
made more evident by the fact that their respective processes of reformulation occurred 
simultaneously.  Thus when it became apparent that capitalist development in import-
substituting LA was taking a path different from that expected, a number of ECLAC 
members began a process of reformulation of the traditional structuralist thought, just at 
the time that an important sector of the left was breaking with the conventional Marxist 
analysis.  Moreover, both reformulations had one extremely important element in 
                                      
7   One should never underestimate the constraints that those working in ECLAC had for their 
analyses of LA’s economic problems; working as a UN bureaucrat may have a lot of advantages, 
but freedom of speech is not one of them!  For example, when Kaldor came to ECLAC in 1956 and 
wrote a paper about Chile (Kaldor, 1956), in which, among other things, he proposed a new (and 
progressive) system of taxation, ECLAC simply refused to publish it (with the most absurd possible 
excuse; for an analysis of Kaldor’s paper and the related events, see Marcel and Palma, 1989).  
Another example is the difficulties encountered by Cardoso and Faletto when they tried to get the 
necessary authorisation from ECLAC’s authorities to publish their book (see Cardoso and Faletto, 
1979; first edition in Spanish, 1969) — one that attempted precisely to be a first step to bridge 
that gap between system analysis and actual feasibility of policy recommendation.  
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common: growing pessimism regarding the feasibility of a dynamic process of capitalist 
development in the periphery.   
ECLAC analysis re-emerged in academic circles in the 1980s as an attempt to re-
examine (and formalise) some of the traditional structuralist hypotheses from the 
perspective of modern economics (see the papers collected in Sunkel, 1993; and 
especially Taylor, 2004).  Although this new approach did make significant contributions 
to macroeconomics and development economics, it has not succeeded in introducing 
structuralism as a new method of enquiry into contemporary mainstream economic 
analysis. 
 
2.2 -  Dependency 
Dependency theories emerged in the early 1960s as attempts to radically transform both 
ECLAC-type structuralist, and Seventh World Congress of the COMINTERN-type Marxist 
thinking about the obstacles facing capitalist development in the periphery (see Palma 
1978).8  There can be little doubt that the Cuban Revolution was the turning point.  This 
new approach argued mostly against both the necessity, and the feasibility of capitalism 
in LA (and in the periphery in general).  Consequently, it also argued against the politics 
of the ‘popular fronts’, and in favour of an attempt towards an immediate transition 
towards socialism.9  
The pre-dependency, pre-Cuban Revolution Marxist approach saw capitalism in 
the periphery as still historically progressive, but argued that the necessary ‘bourgeois-
democratic’ revolution was being inhibited by a new alliance between the two main 
enemies of progress and transformation: imperialism and the traditional elites.  The 
bourgeois-democratic revolution was understood as the revolt of the emerging forces of 
production against the old pre-capitalist relations of production.  The principal battle-line 
in this revolution was supposed to be between the rising industrial bourgeoisie and the 
traditional oligarchies — i.e., between industry and land, capitalism and pre-capitalist 
forms of monopoly and privilege.  Because it was the result of the pressure of a rising 
class whose path was being blocked in economic and political terms, this revolution 
would bring not only political emancipation but economic progress too.  
Therefore, this pre-dependency Marxist approach identified imperialism as the 
main enemy — in one way or another, the omnipresent explanation of every social and 
ideological process that occurred.  The principal target in the struggle was therefore 
unmistakable: North American imperialism.  The allied camp for this fight, on the same 
reasoning, was also clear: it comprised everyone, except those internal groups allied 
with imperialism (the traditional oligarchies).  Thus, the anti-imperialist struggle was at 
the same time a struggle for capitalist emancipation and rapid industrialisation.  The 
local state and the ‘national' bourgeoisie appeared as the potential leading agents for 
                                      
8  In fact, as discussed below, the politics of many ‘dependentistas’ (especially those of its most 
influential branch) had a lot in common with those of the (pre rise of the Nazis in Germany) Sixth 
Congress of the COMINTERN; this was the one that proclaimed (in perhaps the greatest delusion of 
all times) that “the capitalist system was entering the period of its final collapse”.   
9  Broad ‘popular fronts’ emerged from the anti-fascist struggles favoured by the Seventh Congress 
of the COMINTERN. 
 8 
 
capitalist development, which in turn was still viewed as a necessary stage towards 
socialism.  
The post-Cuban Revolution Marxist analysis began to question the very essence 
of this approach, insisting that the local bourgeoisies in the periphery no longer existed 
as a ‘progressive’ social force but had become ‘lumpen’, incapable of meaningful 
productive accumulation or rational political activity, dilapidated by their consumerism 
and blind to their own long-term interest.  It is within this framework that the main 
branch of ‘dependency’ appeared on the scene.  At the same time, both inside and out of 
ECLAC there began to develop the other two major approaches to this analysis (see 
Appendix 2).  
 
3.-  Whatever happened to the structuralists and the ‘dependentistas’ 
after the fall of Allende and the Berlin Wall?  
The two characteristics of structuralist and dependency analyses that are most relevant 
to the story of the subsequent downfall of Latin American critical thinking are the highly 
economicist nature and the increasingly fundamentalist character of a substantial part of 
their pre-1980 intellectual output (especially of the politically most influential 
“development of the underdevelopment” approach to dependency analyses).  What I 
mean here by fundamentalist is that the ‘purity of belief’ increasingly came into conflict 
with the intricacies of the real world.  
The central proposition of my 1978 survey on dependency (Palma, 1978) was 
that in most of these analyses the complex dialectical process of interaction between 
beliefs and reality kept breaking down.  Although not an unusual phenomenon in the 
social sciences, this took rather extreme forms in most dependency studies.  In fact, 
while many ‘dependentistas’ wrote during the 1960s and early 1970s on the supposed 
non-viability of capitalist development in LA, the region was experiencing a rather 
dynamic period of economic growth: while the authors discussed above were busy 
writing about the intrinsic incapacity of peripheral-type capitalism to develop the 
productive forces in LA, in the six countries for which data are available (Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela), productivity per hour worked grew at an 
average annual real rate of 3% for three consecutive decades (1950-1980) — a 
performance that had no precedent in the region, and has had no continuation ever 
since.  Thus, while a considerable part of the Amazon was being deforested to keep up 
with the ‘pessimistic’ dependentista publications of the time, these countries were 
actually ‘catching-up’ with the US during this period — the corresponding rate for the 
latter was only 2.2% p.a.  Overall, during these three decades the average productivity 
per hour worked of these six Latin American countries increased by a factor of 2.4, with 
Brazil and Mexico more than trebled it; i.e., they managed to multiply their productivity 
per hour worked by a factor of 3.6 and 3.3, respectively — one that is similar to that 
which India, Thailand or Vietnam have achieved in the last three decades, and faster 
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than the respective performances of Singapore, Hong-Kong, Malaysia or Indonesia 
during this period (see GGDC, 2014).10   
In other words, these authors — as so much of progressive thinking at the time 
and now — seem to have been totally unable to distinguish between a (well-justified) 
socialist critique of peripheral capitalism, and the analysis of whether this system was 
able to develop — 'warts and all' — the productive forces of the periphery.11  The 
confusion between these two totally different aspect of the analysis — one of the most 
salient aspect of Marx’s work is that he never fell into this populist trap — has been 
perhaps the trade mark of much left-wing thinking since Lenin open the floodgates to 
this type of analysis with his 1916 pamphlet (and continues today unabated).    
There is little doubt that the progressiveness of capitalism has manifested itself in 
the periphery (then and now) rather differently from that in advanced capitalist 
countries, and that it has mostly benefited the elite, or that it has taken on a cyclical 
nature, and that it has manifested differently in the various long-term technological 
cycles of the world economy (Pérez, 2002).  In other words, at the same time that the 
development of capitalism in the periphery has been characterised by its usual 
contradictory and exploitative nature, it has also had its remarkably different specificities 
— and these stem precisely from the particular ways in which these contradictions have 
manifested, the different ways in which many of these countries have faced and 
temporarily overcome them, the ways in which this process has created further 
contradictions, and so on.  It is through this process that the specific dynamic of 
capitalist development in different peripheral countries has actually been generated.  
Reading the political analysis of most ‘dependentistas’ at the time, one is left with 
the impression that the whole question of what course the revolution should take in the 
periphery revolved solely around the problem of whether or not ‘proper’ capitalist 
development was viable.  Their conclusion seems to be that if one were to accept that 
capitalist development is feasible on its own contradictory and exploitative terms, one 
would be automatically bound to adopt the political strategy of waiting (‘Penelope-style’) 
and/or facilitating politically such development until its full productive powers have been 
exhausted — and only then to seek to move towards socialism.  As it is precisely this 
option that these writers wished to reject out of hand, they were obliged to make a 
forced march back towards a pure ideological position in order to deny any possibility of 
meaningful capitalist development in the periphery at the time — even if this was taking 
place in front of their own eyes.   
Oddly enough, nowadays I would struggle to find sufficient publications that are 
properly critical of capitalism in its remarkably disappointing neo-liberal reincarnation to 
justify a similar survey article, even though productivity per worker in most of the region 
has been practically stagnant during the last three decades — the average productivity-
growth for the region as a whole between 1980 and 2013 is just 0.1% p.a. in real terms; 
or 0.16% p.a. in terms of average productivity ‘per hour-worked’ for the seven countries 
                                      
10  Due to lack of data, the corresponding figures for India, Vietnam and Indonesia refer to 
productivity per worker (instead of ‘per worker-hour’).   
11  Analysis and ideology are indissolubly mixed; see, for example, Hugh Stretton (1969); and 
Laclau (1977).   
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for which these data are available (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela).  If the difficult 1980s are excluded, this average productivity-growth 
between 1990 and 2013 is still below 1% p.a (see GGDC, 2014).  And what critical 
literature does exist tends to concentrate mostly on important but rather specific issues, 
such as the urgent need to re-introduce some form of ‘market-friendly’ trade and 
industrial policies, ‘prudent’ capital account regulations, more growth-enhancing macros 
(i.e., one with reasonably competitive exchange rates and ‘softer’ monetary policies), 
and increased investment in human capital and technological innovation and 
absorption.12   
This remarkably unimpressive average does not mean, of course, that nothing 
has been happening in the real economy.  The basic difference between the two periods 
(pre- and post-1980) is that while during the former the ‘engine’ (manufacturing) was 
able to pull along the rest of the economy with it — Kaldorian- and Hirschmanian-style —
during the latter the new ‘engines’ (commodities, retail and finance) have failed to do 
the same.13  As a result, on aggregate, GDP growth during these three decades is almost 
entirely explained by employment creation — and most of this has been generated in 
low-productivity-growth potential/low-wage/mostly precarious jobs in services.14  Not 
surprisingly (for those who attach relevance to this statistic), average TFP growth has 
been negative for most countries of the region during these three decades.   
However, the problem with many ‘dependentistas’ was not only related to how 
‘factual’ matters were revealing their internal theoretical inconsistencies.  It was also 
about the emotional energy that most of them had invested in the idea that peripheral 
capitalism was about to collapse under its own (dead) weight, and the symbolic meaning 
that they began to attach to the almost ‘inevitable’ arrival of socialism in the region.  
Basically, there was no question in their mind that capitalism in LA would dissolve well 
before it had matured.  Even though it could be argued that political events in the 
following four decades may have proved them right in their “now or never” approach to 
the socialist revolution in the region, the question still remains: why did their analyses 
have to be fixated (à-la-Narodnik in late 19th century Russia; see Palma, 1978) on trying 
                                      
12  See for example the papers in Ocampo (2005), and Ocampo and Ros (2011).  Main 
contributions can also be found (among others) in the work of Carlos Díaz-Alejandro, Fernando 
Fajnzylber, Ricardo Ffrench-Davis, Roberto Frenkel, Carlota Pérez, and (the honorary Latin 
American) Lance Taylor.   
13  In Brazil, for example, between 1950 and 1980 the rates of growth of manufacturing and GDP 
per annum were remarkably high and very similar (8.5% and 7% p.a., respectively), while in the 
years since the beginning of economic reforms (1990), exports have grown twice as fast as GDP 
(6.3% and 3% p.a., respectively), with manufacturing collapsing to just 1.6% p.a. (see World 
Bank, WDI, 2014, and ECLAC, 2014, for earlier years).  The Mexican case is also particularly 
interesting to analyse since the relative stagnation of the country’s average productivity in the two 
decades since the beginning of NAFTA (less than 0.6% growth p.a. — i.e., less than one-fifth its 
rate between 1950 and 1981) took place in a context of both unprecedented inflows of FDI (the 
highest in the world in per capita terms) and practically unrestricted market access to the US — 
the first two items on most DCs’ growth agenda today (for Mexico see Moreno and Ros, 2009, and 
Palma, 2005a).   
14  As far as (gross) employment elasticities are concerned, Latin American countries’ post-1980 
elasticities are about twice as high as anybody else’s (see Palma, 2010).  A sectoral analysis 
indicates that LA’s high employment elasticities are entirely due to services; for example, between 
1980 and 2013 Brazil created 55 million jobs in all, of which about 80% were in services — mostly 
of the type mentioned above.   
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to prove the economic non-viability of capitalism in LA in order to argue for this “now or 
never” hypothesis (as if one was a necessary pre-condition for the other)?    
Since Picasso once said that “every portrait also has to have elements of a 
caricature”, perhaps I may be forgiven for providing one: a great deal of dependency 
analysis became a bit like one of those cults that predict the end of the world – in this 
case, “the end of capitalism in the periphery is nigh!”  The serious point I am making, of 
course, is that the problem with the members of those cults is what are you supposed to 
do the day after the predicted doomsday date has passed?  Especially when capitalism, 
far from collapsing like a house of cards, gained instead a new and powerful lease of life 
as a result of a rather remarkable set of events far away, such as the neo-liberal reforms 
in advanced countries, and the surprisingly successful post-Berlin Wall new process of 
re-legitimisation of capital.  The region’s oligarchy in particular gained a new lease of 
political life characterised by a degree of political and ideological hegemonic control not 
seen in the region since before the First World War.   
The notion that this new lease of life for capitalism in LA has so far not been 
particularly dynamic (Palma, 2010) does not change the fact that capitalism did get a 
new lease of life when it was supposed to collapse — ‘sub-prime’ capitalism is still 
capitalism.  The lack of dynamism is fundamentally related to the fact that the logic of 
accumulation and policy-making switched from state-led ISI-industrialisation to what 
could be called “plantation economics cum downwardly-flexible labour markets, 
sophisticated retail and easy finance”.  Therefore, industrialists lost most of their political 
power to those associated with commodities, finance and retail — making LA resemble 
what could have probably happened in the US had the South won the Civil War.15  As a 
result, the new lease of life of Latin American capitalism has been characterised mostly 
by rentier and predatory forms of accumulation (by both domestic and foreign capital), 
which followed a rather extreme process of primitive accumulation especially through 
remarkably corrupt privatisations.16  Not surprisingly, this faltering process of 
accumulation has brought not only ‘premature de-industrialisation’, but also economies 
with little or no capacity to increase labour productivity (particularly when measured in 
‘per hour-worked’ terms, rather than ‘per worker’).  Still, the poor performance of most 
countries in LA does not change the fact that capitalism was politically re-energised 
when it was supposed to disintegrate.  
There is little doubt that many structuralists and some ‘dependentistas’ did make 
substantial contributions to our understanding of how capitalism works in the periphery.  
Dependency analysis also had a powerful impact on the anti-capitalist and anti-
imperialist struggles in the region.  It even had an impact on the anti-fascist struggles in 
Spain and Portugal.  And, of course, many dependentistas were prepared to put their 
own lives on the line for their ideas.  But as a whole, dependency analysis as an 
                                      
15  Consequently, the manufacturing industry was decimated.  For example, in today’s Brazil the 
share of manufacturing in GDP is less than half what it was in 1980; also, no country in the world 
has had such a drop in its rate of growth of manufacturing output as Brazil (9.5% between 1965 
and 1980, and 1% since then; or 1.6% since the beginning of economic reforms in 1990).  For an 
analysis of this process of ‘premature’ de-industrialisation, see Bresser-Pereira (2013); the 
corresponding chapter in this Handbook; and Palma (2005b), (2008b), and (2013a).   
16  For the many shady privatisations in the Chilean case, see especially Monckeberg (2001); see 
also Palma (2013b).  
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intellectual approach ended up being significantly constrained by its extreme 
economicism and its growing fundamentalism (and ‘concept-worshipping’) in which, as 
mentioned above, the purity of belief inevitably came into conflict with the complexities 
of the real world. 
From my point of view, this growing fundamentalism was related to the fear that 
by allowing new ideas or forms into one’s system of belief they might destroy the belief 
itself.  An example of such an idea for many dependentistas would have been a real 
consideration of the possibility that the struggle for socialism in post-Cuban-Revolution 
LA might yet prove to be a rather long, intricate and, in general, a pretty uncertain 
affair.  And for structuralists, an example of such an idea would have been the 
realisation that the emerging ISI-industrial-bourgeoisie was quite happy to appropriate 
all forms of rents created by the state with their ISI policies, provided they did not come 
(as in East Asia) with performance-related conditionalities, or that they would have had 
to move eventually to a meaningful process of regional integration.  That is, when it 
became obvious (yet again) that the Latin American capitalist elite only likes carrots that 
come with no sticks!   
The dread of a collapse in one’s system of belief can easily bring the destructive 
instinct into play; a fundamentalist system of belief needs constantly to ‘purify’ the realm 
of ideas.  There can be no such thing as the right of dissent.  For example, in 
dependency analysis one finds increasingly in time Britton’s proposition of an inverse 
relationship between the expectation to understand the real world and the intolerance of 
dissent (see Britton, 2002).  This, of course, is not unique to dependency analysis, as it 
has also characterised a particular intolerant neo-liberal ideology afterwards; for 
example, Gustavo Franco (Harvard PhD, and one-time heterodox economist), when 
asked as Head of Brazil’s Central Bank during Cardoso’s first term of office why he 
became neo-liberal, his answer was simply: in Brazil at the time “the choice [was] 
between being neo-liberal or neo-idiotic [neo-burro]” (Veja, 15 November 1996).17  
However, even if a significant part of dependency analysis was eventually 
hijacked by fundamentalist beliefs, the post-war Latin American critical tradition did have 
a great deal of critical creativity, especially in the way in which it tried to articulate many 
of its inputs (French structuralism, the German Historical School and Keynesian and Post 
Keynesian macroeconomics) with Latin American economic and political realities.18  Of 
course, part of the subsequent problem also came as an influence from ‘abroad’ when in 
a great deal of dependency analysis this mix was eventually taken over by “global 
dogmatic left-wing thinking”, which characterised radical thinking — both Marxist and 
non-Marxist — in so much of the world at the time.  And this phenomenon helps to 
explain why this critical tradition collapsed when the overall political climate changed for 
reasons that were pretty much unrelated to LA.  
In sum, as an intellectual movement, the pre-1980 critical tradition in LA had 
many original inputs and creative thinkers, but no strong political and social base.  
Moreover, a great deal of the movement was eventually seduced by fundamentalist 
                                      
17  For a similar simplistic ideological discourse, but in dependency analysis, see some of the 
related papers in Latin American Perspectives.  
18  Cardoso once called this ‘the originality of the copy’ (1977).   
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beliefs not just due to the above-mentioned influence of ‘global’ dogmatic radical 
thinking of the time but also due to the fact that most of its analyses got stuck in 
analytical cul-de-sacs.  As mentioned above, in the case of the structuralists the latter 
happened when it became obvious that the Latin American capitalist elite was quite 
happy to appropriate all forms of rents created by the state with their ISI policies, 
provided they came with no ‘compulsions’ of any kind.  In turn, in the case of the Marxist 
left associated with the Communist Parties, this happened when it became obvious that 
broad ‘anti-imperialist alliances’ did not work because the domestic bourgeoisies were 
anything but anti-imperialist.  And in the case of the ‘insurgent’ left, this point was 
reached when it became obvious that the Cuban Revolution was not replicable in the rest 
of the region, even if the armed struggle was led by a figure such as Ernesto Guevara.  
As Marx had warned us a long time ago in his analysis of events in France in 
1848, “people make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do 
not make it under circumstances they themselves have chosen, but under given and 
inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted” (1852).  A statement 
relatively easy to understand in a superficial sense, but rather more complicated to 
integrate properly into one’s political analysis and action!   
The election of Allende in Chile in 1970 gave all branches of dependency analysis 
a much needed boost (and many structuralists and ‘dependentistas’ held senior jobs in 
government), but with the deaths of Allende and of the ‘Chilean Road to Socialism’, 
structuralism and dependency analysis went into a steep decline, which in the case of 
the latter proved to be a terminal one.  
There were also powerful external political pressures on the different branches of 
dependency analysis to become what they did, and then to collapse as they did.  
Capacities to respond and to adapt to external political pressures are indeed a crucial 
component of the explanation of the varying fortunes of critical analysis in LA.  In fact, in 
the intellectual life of the region after 1980 the key transformation was for the political 
pressures to switch from a premium on critical thinking to one on ‘acquiescence’.  
So, structuralist and dependency analyses were not only too ‘economicist’ and (in 
the case of most of the latter) increasingly fundamentalist, but also got themselves into 
analytical ‘dead-ends’, which in part explains not only why they were obliterated by later 
events, but also why it has proved to be so remarkably difficult to recover subsequently.  
That is, these cul-de-sacs were so intractable that they seem to have led structuralists 
and ‘dependentistas’ to fail in what Keynes calls “the struggle of escape” (following his 
own efforts to break out from the analytical constraints of mainstream economics of the 
time; see Keynes, 1936, p.9).   
So, what needs to be analysed next is not only why most of the Latin American left 
lost its absolute certainties; it is also why, instead of moving from a position of absolute 
certainty to one of absolute doubt — or, ideally, to a more creative position based on 
uncomfortable uncertainties — it actually chose to move from one type of absolute belief 
to another.  That is, why an important part of the Latin American left was seduced by the 
next available religion: neo-liberalism of the type embodied in Mrs. Thatcher’s favourite 
slogan: “THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE”.  
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4.-  Switching from one form of ‘absolute belief’ to another  
Even though much has been said regarding the ideological transformation of most of the 
Latin American left after the 1982 debt crisis and the fall of the Berlin Wall, the basic 
question remains: why has the mainstream of Latin American socialism mutated from a 
“dangerous” idea/movement to becoming the capitalist elite’s best friend — especially so 
of that famous top 1%?  The two Socialist parties in Chile, the Workers’ Party in Brazil 
(and the ANC in South Africa) are the paradigmatic cases.19  One of the key problems for 
the left today is the difficulty in implementing a progressive development agenda, one 
that now has to be appropriate to the new world order with its new technological 
paradigm, the rise of China and India, and so on.  This type of agenda requires a 
sufficiently strong domestic constituency behind it so as to be able simultaneously to 
take on all the ‘usual suspects’ (in the form of international and domestic forces) that are 
fiercely opposed to it.  This constituency is required, for example, for the state to be able 
to impose ‘East Asian-style’ discipline on capitalists (and sometimes on workers); it is 
also required to carry out other necessary economic and social restructuring, like the 
modernisation of the state, a progressive system of taxation — that includes the 
appropriation of rents associated with natural resources — and the implementation of 
trade and industrial policies that would ensure the productive use of all forms of rents, 
better technological absorption, etc.  One of the main lessons of the economic and 
political history of the South is that these strategies seem to be feasible only if those at 
the top happen to face relatively limited internal opposition.  That is, in most places 
apart from East Asia — which had a very peculiar history to do with Japanese colonialism 
— this has proved very difficult to organise politically (see Khan, 2000).  
The ‘new left’ in LA is characterised by having come to the conclusion (a bit too 
eagerly) that, under the current domestic and international constraints, the assemblage 
of the necessary social constituencies for progressive development agendas is off the 
political map.  As a result they gave up their progressive agendas, abandoned the 
economy as the fundamental site of the struggle, and eventually conceded the whole 
terms of the debate.20  Why?  
In the answer to this question there are two distinct and separate interacting 
issues.  One relates to the complexities of the period’s politics and political economy 
(both at home, and in the international arena); the other, to subjects such as ideology 
                                      
19  For example, when Fernando Flores (Allende’s Minister of Finance and de facto Chief of Staff) 
returned to Chilean politics after the fall of the dictatorship, he put his return down to having “got 
bored with making money”.  When he then ran for a seat in the Senate, he organised the best 
campaign that money could buy, which included flying around in a private jet lent (and paid) by 
his close friend, Carlos Slim — according to all rankings, one of the three richest persons on earth 
(see http://www.ricardoroman.cl/content/view/519/Fernando-Flores-lider-innovador.html).  For an 
early analysis of the ‘new left’ phenomenon in the Australian context, see Harcourt and Kerr 
(1980).  For an analysis of economic ideas and institutional change in the Twentieth Century, see 
Blyth (2002), Chang (2003); Kozul-Wright and Rayment (2007); and Reinert (2007).   
20  According to Faletto, for many in the left suddenly “the core issues that had characterised 
dependency analysis — national autonomy and sovereignty, and alternative development 
strategies — looked as if made totally irrelevant by new events, and the only apparent alternative 
became how to integrate quickly into the ‘new modernity’” (1999: 25; my translation); a 
‘modernity’ that according to Adorno had a peculiar characteristic: “Today the appeal to newness, 
of no matter what kind, provided only that it is archaic enough, has become universal” (1974).   
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and the nature of the Latin American ‘progressive’ intelligentsia.21  Starting with the first, 
one aspect that is necessary to take into account is the political pressure put on left-wing 
parties by the difficult transitions to democracy.  Democratic governments became 
possible in LA (and South Africa) during the rapidly changing 1980s and early 1990s — a 
period of radical political change in the US and Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
rapid globalisation, the rise of the East, new technological and institutional paradigms, 
and so on.  And they became possible in part due to controversial political settlements 
based on an agreement (partly explicit, partly implicit) that the new democratic forces 
when in power would not challenge existing structures of property rights, rents or 
incentives.  Probably the best way to summarise the nature of these transitions to 
democracy in LA is that implicit in these was the understanding that Latin Americans 
would get their much desired freedom of speech, provided that in practice they would 
not demand, and eventually they would not even think, what they had previously been 
forbidden to say.  
One immediate problem emerging from these new political settlements that 
allowed democratic governments to be elected was how to sell them to the electorate.  
The Chilean case is typical — especially in terms of how in LA the two sets of issues 
mentioned above interacted during this period (complex politics and political economy, 
with fragile ideologies and the nature of the Latin American ‘progressive’ intelligentsia).  
As is well known, when Pinochet called the 1988 plebiscite (to remain in power for 
another eight years) he tried to make it into a plebiscite on the effectiveness of his neo-
liberal economic policies and not one on democracy and human rights.  After long 
deliberation, the leaders of the democratic movement in Chile (the “Concertación”) 
decided not to fall into that trap and to make instead the central issue of the plebiscite 
whether or not Chile should continue for another eight years as a banana republic 
(rather than the supposed effectiveness of the neo-liberal economic reforms).  The cost 
of this strategy for the democratic forces was to give a tacit support to Pinochet’s neo-
liberal economic model — at least by default.  The benefit was to win a very difficult 
plebiscite.  Of course, many people expected this tacit support to change once the new 
democratic government was in office.  But no such luck!  Why?  The answer to this takes 
us to the second set of issues mentioned above: once in government, the ‘Concertación’ 
followed the well-known path of so many crucial ideological transformations in history.  
Change always seems to start as urgent practical ‘necessities’, not for intellectual 
reasons.  These urgent necessities are transformed into actions that are soon articulated 
into ‘policies’, to find their way then to becoming ‘ideology’.  Almost before anybody 
could notice, the ‘Concertación’ government, (especially its economists with the longest 
record of criticising the neo-liberal model while Pinochet was in power) became 
converted to the four key dogmas of neo-liberal thinking.22  
                                      
21  However, in the analyses of historical events one has to make inevitably an almost 
metaphysically effort two separate analytically these two sides of the opposition, and how they 
interacted in those events.  
22  i) Anything that happened before the neo-liberal reforms was wrong, inefficient and populist; ii) 
once the reforms have been implemented (reforms which simply attempted to create a future 
which was fundamentally the exact opposite of that past), any problem that emerged could only be 
solved by more neo-liberal reforms — or, if more liberalisations, privatisations, de-regulations or 
tax cuts could not solve a given problem, that was a case of a problem that had no solution (at the 
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The main point I am making here is that this transformation of these ‘urgent 
necessities’ into ‘policy’, and then into ‘ideology’ (of the neo-liberal-left-type) — or from 
tactic to strategy, and then to principle — has a further twist in LA.  How truthful and 
extreme were those ‘urgent necessities’?  How much was this ‘fierce urgency of now’ 
also self-constructed contingencies, in the sense that they resulted, at least in part, from 
having already opted for the risk-averse option to continue with an unmodified neo-
liberal economic model?  That is, how much were they also simply overstated as an 
excuse for regaining lost powers and privileges — for which countless tears of saudade 
had been shed?23   
In other words, following Sartre’s concept of ‘mauvaise foi’ (bad faith),24 what I 
am really saying is that I believe that a key component of the ‘urgent necessities’ 
argument used by the ‘new left’ everywhere in LA, but especially in Chile and Brazil (and 
South Africa), was simply an exercise destined as much to deceive others as to deceive 
themselves into believing that the transformation of society had become the ultimate 
unacceptable risk.  
Of course, the ‘good governance’ agenda of the Washington Consensus helped in 
this direction, as in the small print it contains two additional items for ex-critical thinkers 
now in the government: one is that the first thing they should learn is how to ‘govern’ 
their own critical tendencies.  The other is that they have to do whatever is necessary to 
govern the critical tendencies of the rest of the left.  The mechanism was simple enough: 
they had to dramatise to the extreme the economic risks associated with any progressive 
agenda — i.e., possible speculative attacks, exchange rate crises, perilous stampedes by 
restless fund managers, inflationary pressures, fiscal collapses, and so on.  This is not 
really difficult to achieve, since in the new model ‘openness, liberalisation, deregulation 
and flexibility’ — particularly in the financial sphere — in actual fact mean a (self-
constructed) scenario characterised by hugely increased risks and heightened 
uncertainties, leading to a situation in which one has to live permanently under the logic 
of a ‘state of emergency’.  
And as progressive change came off the political agenda, the Latin American left 
separated into three camps: the ‘managerial’ left, the ‘traditional’ one, and the ‘radical’.  
The first, which included the majority of the ‘official left’, together with aiming at the 
reversal of as many aspects of the previous development strategy and policies as 
                                                                                                                      
beginning of the 20th Century, a Chilean President (Ramón Barros Luco) famously said that in life 
“there are only two types of problems: those that will get solved by themselves, and those that 
have no solution.” The neo-liberal version of this world-view is that now there are also only two 
types of problems: those that can be solved by more neo-liberal reforms, and those (including, of 
course, inequality) that have no solution); iii) the only role of economic policy is to generate 
‘credibility’; and this can only be achieved by keeping the top 1% sweet; and iv) the only way 
forward is to open up the economy fully to globalised capitalism, especially its finances, even if this 
means having to live from then on permanently in an economic ‘state of emergency’ — and, of 
course, in such a high economic risk environment, the transformation of society becomes the 
ultimate unacceptable risk (on the latter point, see Arantes, 2007; see also Palma, 2010).  
23  In this context, perhaps Freud (1908) gives us a clue: “Anyone who knows anything of the 
mental life of human beings is aware that hardly anything is more difficult for them than to give up 
a pleasure they have once tasted.  Really we can never relinquish anything; we only exchange one 
thing for something else.  When we appear to give something up, all we really do is to adopt a 
substitute.”  
24  For a definition of an argument of ‘bad faith’, see Sartre (1993).  
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possible, reinvented itself as a new political movement with only one “progressive” 
challenge ahead: to manage effectively a new type of social-risk ‘hedging-State’ (i.e., 
one with an efficient agenda of safety-nets).  The ‘traditional’ left, in turn, also continued 
to be stuck in the past, but in this case by trying to reproduce it — as in some sectors of 
the Venezuelan and Argentinian left.  The third, the radical camp, tried instead to remain 
as a critical thinking force, but today is rapidly becoming an endangered species — 
helped to endure in this difficult struggle only by several spontaneous outbursts of 
students’ discontent, particularly in Chile and Brazil.  
In terms of the ‘managerial left’, what is ironic in this respect is how my ‘neo-
comrades’ are also still stuck in the past.  In fact, it would not be an exaggeration to say 
that they are so as much as the ‘traditional’ left, because while the latter simply 
attempts to replicate past economic policies as if we were still in the same old 
technological paradigm, and in the same pre-1980 international economic order, the 
former equally wants to do the same, but exactly the other way round.  That is, they 
seem to be guided by a discourse that resembles a compass whose 'magnetic North' is 
simply the reversal of as many aspects of the previous development strategy and 
policies as possible — i.e., everything the other way round (plus “clusters”).  The mere 
idea that different, more pragmatic and more imaginative alternatives could exist, as 
those attempted in Asia — alternatives that could be more appropriate to the current 
technological and global institutional environment — is rejected out of hand.  For 
example, if pre-1980 (pre-1973 in Chile) economic policies in the region were 
characterised by high tariffs, strict capital controls, strong presence of the state as a 
direct producer, public investment as high as two-digits of GDP, relatively progressive 
taxation, the appropriation of rents from natural resources, clearly defined industrial 
policies, and so on, today they preach exactly the opposite: free-trade, free capital 
movements, the privatisation of everything that moves in the public sector, low levels of 
public investment (since 1980 public investment has not averaged more than 3% of GDP 
in any country in LA), regressive taxation, no proper royalties to appropriate the rent 
from natural resources, no trade or industrial policies (at most some ‘horizontal’ 
incentives), and so on.   
In sum, the new development strategy of the ‘new-left’, and its related economic 
policies, has a simple guiding principle: to think now of what before was considered 
“virtue” as “vice”, and what was considered “vice” as “virtue”.  This narrow ‘reverse-
gear’ attitude has delivered not only a disappointing economic performance (particularly 
in terms of productivity-growth), but also rather odd political settlements characterised 
by a combination of an insatiable top 1%, a captured ‘progressive’ political élite (the 
dominant classes are quite happy to let them govern as long as they do not forget who 
they are), passive citizens, and a stalled social imagination — all made more palatable 
by an agenda of safety-nets.  A dull mélange that at times is sparked off by outbursts of 
students’ discontent.  And while both the ‘traditional’, and the ‘new’ left are still stuck in 
the past, the world moves on, there is a technological revolution that has changed 
almost everything, international financial markets have become monstrously large (and 
have detached from the real economy, and become self-destructive), OECD economies 
are ever more geriatric, and Asia forges ahead.   
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Perhaps most of the Latin American left — at least its ‘traditional’ and its ‘new’ 
versions — should heed the warning from that famous salsa: “¿Y tu que haces en el 
anden?  ¡Sube que te deja el tren”!25  
Perhaps nothing shows better this Latin American narrow ‘reverse-gear’ attitude 
in terms of development strategies and economic policies than a statement made by the 
head of Brazil’s Central Bank (a former heterodox economist) at the time of Cardoso’s 
economic reforms; when asked about the soul of their economic agenda, his reply was to 
the point: “[having] to undo forty years of stupidity” (Veja 15 November 1996).  Nothing 
explains more accurately the rigidity with which the reforms were implemented in LA — 
i.e., an approach that simply multiplied previous policies by minus one — and their poor 
outcome, than this almost childish attitude (so different from that in Asia!).   
Here the million-dollar question is why is it that in LA (now and in the past) 
ideologies tend to be so remarkably rigid?  My own perspective in this is that a crucial 
component of the answer lies in the fact that in LA there is little else in the form of social 
cohesion!26  But, whatever the reason for this perennial ideological rigidity, what we find 
in LA in the last 30 years (as the subtitle of this paper indicates) was a movement from 
one type of ‘absolute certainties’ to another — which turned out to be the exact opposite 
of the former.  
And in order to implement successfully their still-stuck-in-the-past ideology, the 
critical trick of the managerial majority was to disguise their new pro-business approach 
(which in the Latin American context, inevitably means pro-large oligopolistic corporate 
interest) in a fog of “new-look” pragmatism; and, in particular, never to say or do 
anything that could wake the socialist ghosts of the past.  Eventually, for them to be or 
not to be left-wing became practically a biographical fact — just an eccentric detail that 
needed to be played down in their résumé.27  It also helped them to convince themselves 
and the rest of society that the ‘dissident’ left-wing camp that tried to look forward was 
just made up of pedantic doctrinaires — or, as Cardoso labelled them, of “neo-bobos” 
(neo-silly).  
Perhaps what has happened in LA in this respect can be better explained (as 
Arantes does) by restating Adorno.  For him “intelligence is a moral category” (1951: 
197); maybe there are times — as is the case of LA today — when a lack of critical 
thinking can also be turned into a ‘moral category’.  
It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that perhaps there is an important 
similarity here between (former best friends) Mrs. Thatcher and Pinochet.  In one of her 
last interviews, the ex-British Prime Minister (rightly) said that her finest political 
achievement was ‘New Labour’.  Likewise, perhaps the greatest political achievement of 
Pinochet (and other military dictators of that time) is the Latin American ‘new-left’.   
                                      
25  “What are you doing on the platform?  Jump in; the train is leaving you behind”.  
26  See, for example, Palma (2010 and 2011).  
27  In a recent speech, Lula has dismissed his revolutionary past as being down to his youth at the 
time; however, now “maturity has distanced me from the left” (quoted in FOLHAONLINE, 2 May 
2008, available at http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/ brasil/ult96u87635.shtml).  In his newly 
acquired wisdom, he went on to say that “if one finds an older person that is left-wing, that person 
has a problem.  And if one finds a young person that is right-wing, that person also has a problem” 
(ibid.). 
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According to Paulo Arantes (2007), Pascal’s philosophy could also help explain the 
ideological metamorphosis of the ‘managerial’ camp.  One just has to follow the ritual 
“behave as if you believe and credibility will come along.  […]   Show a rigid devotion to 
the liturgy and you will end up believing.”  The secret is to do it with the regularity of an 
automaton.  The key is not to mix what you do with what you say you do.  Split 
discourse from reality, and create false dichotomies, like claiming that the choice is to be 
either a ‘grown up pragmatist’ or a ‘peddler of dreams’.   
No doubt all this has an element of pragmatism, which is necessary for political 
survival — particularly in LA.  But there is nothing like automatism as a force towards 
giving up, little by little, and almost without noticing, one’s own convictions.  And there 
is surely a difference between pragmatism and ‘cynical-realism.’   
And as Oliveira (2006) has argued, almost before anybody could notice change 
did not only happen at the level of ideas but also at a politico-institutional one — and the 
Workers’ Party in Brazil, for example, began to resemble closely a ‘Peronist-type’ party in 
its style of government, in the way it dealt with internal dissent and in its growing level 
of corruption.  And in Chile, according to a former president of Allende’s Socialist party, 
his party now resembles a “pure clientelist machinery” (see Basadre, 2008). 
Another instrumental political-economy factor helping the emergence of the ‘new-
left’ has been that within the Iberian tradition societies are often run by huge State 
apparatuses full of faceless bureaucrats prepared to follow whatever ideology is the 
order of the day.  This political weakness of (what Mushtaq Khan has called) “the 
administrative classes” has proved to be of great help for the implementation of the 
political agenda of the new ‘managerial left’.  
However, the issue of why it was so difficult for most socialist thinkers in LA (and 
elsewhere) to integrate ‘markets’ with their previously held beliefs is a complex one.  As 
Gramsci said, for an ideology to remain hegemonic it has to be able to absorb (in a 
creative sense) elements from alternative ideologies.  But the bottom line is that in this 
case new ideas, instead of interacting creatively with existing ones, ended up shattering 
the previous system of belief; so, a new set of ideas and beliefs ended up simply 
replacing the preceding ones.  This did not happen in Asia, at least nowhere to the same 
extent as in LA.  For example, in many countries in Asia economic reform was 
implemented in a much more pragmatic, imaginative and diverse way, and all actors in 
favour of the reforms (including local capitalist elites and most ex anti-capitalist 
intellectuals) were probably just too cynical to be charmed by fashionable new Western 
ideologies — especially if most of the so-called “new” ideas were just recycled ones from 
the past (see Krugman, 1995).  In short, they did not fall, as their Latin counterparts 
did, for the mirage of “newness”.  At the same time, a critical tradition remained — as 
was the case, for example, in India.  
From this perspective, perhaps what led to economic reforms being implemented 
so differently in LA and in many countries in Asia after 1980 (remarkably rigid in the 
former, with an important component of pragmatism in the latter) is that in the former 
policy-makers of most political persuasions, including the ‘new left’, were just too eager 
to believe that neo-liberalism and the Washington Consensus were a set of ingenious 
tricks devised by Dumbledore, while in the latter they instinctively suspected that most 
likely they were the work of Voldemort…  
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And to understand the work of the latter one could resort to Darwin.  As Tony 
Lawson has argued (in a different context), “[...]a central and great Darwinian insight is 
that a subset of members of a population may come to flourish relative to other 
members simply because they possess a feature, which others do not, that renders them 
relatively suited to some local environment.  The question of the intrinsic worth of those 
who flourish most is not relevant to the story” (Lawson, 2003).  Natural selection 
mechanisms of this sort are crucial to understanding what neo-liberalism is really about: 
it is about deliberately creating an artificial economic environment that is most suited to 
those features that capital has and others do not — in the jungle, capital is king!  The 
neo-liberal discourse may be apparently about promoting ‘order’ based on freedom, 
individual initiative and sound macroeconomics, and about fighting paternalism.  But 
what it has turned out to be is the promotion of a special type of ‘disorder’ that can help 
legitimise the supremacy of capital, as in a high-risk and unstable environment only it 
can thrive.  
Something similar to the ‘new left’ phenomenon in LA happened to the ANC in 
South Africa.  In its first twenty years in office the ANC has not challenged the previous 
structure of property rights and incentives — creating a black capitalist elite through the 
‘black empowerment’ programme can hardly be called a ‘challenge’ to them.  In fact, it 
has proved to be the most effective mechanism to reinforce them!  Furthermore, the 
ANC has actually strengthened the previous structure of property rights by, for example, 
opening the capital account to legal capital flight by the white oligarchy — a right they 
never had under Apartheid.  Moreover, more than anyone else in the world the ANC did 
have the political constituency necessary to construct a feasible alternative progressive 
agenda.   
In LA, only Lula and the Workers’ Party in 2002 had a political constituency for 
this that could possibly resemble that of the ANC in 1994 — a capacity to transform that 
was also very much wasted.  
In sum, even if one were to agree with the majority of the ‘new left’ that there 
was little option but to accept a political settlement of the kind found in LA and South 
Africa,28 and even if it is possible to understand that part of the logic of this strategy was 
both to tell ‘stories’ to their base (to hide backroom agreements not to investigate 
corrupt privatisations and so on), and to tell ‘stories’ to the capitalist elite and 
international financial markets (in order to conceal their initial reluctant acceptance of 
the neo-liberal model), what truly amazes me from the point of view of the nature of the 
Latin American intelligentsias, and their fragile ideologies is how easily the ‘story-telling’ 
convinced the story-tellers themselves!   
In fact, a good example of how the two types of issues mentioned above 
interacted in LA was that often the crucial factor in the credibility of the story being told 
ended up being whether the story-teller himself or herself truly believed in it.29  For 
example, one of the crucial problems of the new left governments was that if they 
                                      
28  I firmly believe that democratic forces had much more room for manoeuvre than what they 
were prepared to acknowledge at the time.  
29  Adorno once said that a German is someone who cannot tell a lie without believing it himself 
(or herself); maybe my ‘neo-comrades’ are now the ones that cannot tell a story without believing 
it themselves!  
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wanted to continue with the neo-liberal model, especially fully-open finance, they had to 
be ‘credible’ with international and domestic financial markets.  But how to sell 
‘credibility’ if they had never previously believed in neo-liberal economics and politics 
themselves?  How to sell credibility after so many years of neo-liberal atheism?  Surely 
their former hostilities did not make for the best ‘business card’!  So it seems that to be 
credible and to placate international and domestic financial markets there was little 
alternative (given the options they took) but to become true born-again neo-liberals.  
Nothing less would do.30   
I sometimes wonder whether the brand of neo-liberalism that the ‘new left’ in LA 
ended up constructing was just shorthand for “nothing left to decide” — and, of course, 
“nothing left to think about critically”.  Indeed, the new left’s attitude towards neo-liberal 
economics today resembles Lord Kelvin’s attitude towards physics at the end of the 19th 
century, when he declared that “there is nothing new to be discovered in physics now.  
All that remains is more and more precise measurement” (1990).31  
Of course, there is a ‘real’ world out there, and the radical left is certainly not 
known for its capacity to construct practical alternatives.32  But why did the managerial 
left have to move all the way to a ‘sub-prime’ neo-liberal understanding of the world in 
order to be able to construct ‘practical’ alternatives under current political and political-
economy constraints?  If the managerial left in LA was willing to concede the economy as 
the fundamental hub of the struggle, why were they not even able to construct a 
‘practical’ alternative which at least contained a more liberal-progressive Keynesian 
understanding of economic life, and a more radical-democratic understanding of political 
life?  Why were they so desperately keen to concede the economy, the terms of the 
debate, and almost everything else?  Why when events moved in such a wrong direction 
did they feel that they had lost all their progressive relevance, and therefore were unable 
to hold basic ideological principles in their minds in a thoughtful way?  And why do they 
have to look at the past with such contempt?  So much so that all they want to do now is 
the exact opposite!  
From this perspective (and as opposed to the economicistic reductionism of the 
Washington Consensus), one should not forget that according to Foucault neo-liberalism, 
at least in its origins, was conceived not as a set of economic policies, but mostly as a 
‘positive’ form of social regulation — one that went far beyond the usually acknowledged 
                                      
30  The Chilean Finance Minister between 2000 and 2006 — a member of one of the two socialist 
parties, and former member of the Communist Party (later top executive at the IMF) — is reported 
to have said while in office that the reason why Chile was performing so much better than the rest 
of LA at the time was that “in Chile, we truly believe in the neo-liberal model, while the rest of LA 
implemented this model only because they had no option but to do so”. 
31  An analogy with quantum mechanics could help to illustrate this point.  Since its inception, the 
many counter-intuitive results of “QM” have provoked philosophical debates — Einstein seemed to 
have particularly enjoyed them.  However, a school of thought argues that physicists should not 
waste time with metaphysical issues; so they call themselves “the shut up and calculate school of 
quantum mechanics”.  When discussing these issues with my managerial ‘neo-comrades’, their 
usual response could often be summarised along the same manic lines: ‘shut up and calculate 
something useful’; stop drowning in critical thinking — do an MBA!  (Once a Chilean ‘new-left’ 
friend jokingly quoted at me Neruda’s most famous verse: “Me gustas cuando callas, por que estas 
como ausente”...  [I like you when you are silent, as though you were absent]).   
32  As a counter example, see Harcourt (2006, chapter 8).   
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set of ‘negative’ reactions to the Keynesian Welfare State (such as the retreat of the 
state and the lifting of controls and regulation necessary to unleash again ‘unfettered 
market forces’, or about the disappearance of the nation-state).  It was in fact supposed 
to be a novel reconfiguration of power leading to a new type of ‘governmentality’ — i.e., 
a new form of interaction between political power (and knowledge and discourse) and 
the dynamics of the unregulated market.  If only my ‘neo-comrades’ had understood 
this, and made an effort to make sure that neo-liberalism would at least steer towards 
that original aim!33   
What seems to be peculiar to LA is that when the above mentioned idea of the 
unremitting critique of the economy got stuck within dependency analyses, those within 
this tradition who wanted to shift to other critical discourses in an organic way (such as 
towards radical democracy, gender identity, the fate of indigenous people, the 
environment, and so on), because their previous analyses had been based almost 
exclusively on an economicist critique of capitalism, found it almost impossible to do so.  
That is, the left that wanted to abandon the economy as the fundamental site of the 
struggle but still continued to think critically, found it very difficult (if not impossible) to 
do so as it seems to have felt that it had lost not just some but most — if not all — its 
progressive significance.  That was not the case in many other regions, where a 
significant part of the left was able to shift their analytical focus from ‘the economy’ to 
other issues; so, critical thinking could at least continue.34    
What is crucial here is that as the ‘new left’ in LA believes that it cannot get 
political power to implement its own progressive agenda, it ended up trying to gain 
power to implement what Francisco de Oliveira has called an “upside-down hegemony” 
(Oliveira, 2006).  In short, “if you can't beat them, join them” became the (not-so) 
innovative ‘battle cry’ of my neo-comrades — together with their ‘third way’ discourse 
(which proved to be just a phoney ideological disguise).35   
And LA’s ‘new left’ has proved to be remarkably effective in the implementation of 
their upside-down hegemony; according to a the Wealth Report (2014), in the last ten 
years no other main region in the world has created so many millionaires (i.e., 
individuals with US$ 30 million or more in terms of net assets, excluding their principal 
residence), centa-millionaires (those with net assets of more than US$ 100 million), and 
billionaires as LA has done.  And within LA, perhaps not surprisingly, those countries with 
‘centre-left’ governments are the ones with a rate of increase of these types of 
millionaires well above-average.  Among these, in terms of new millionaires created in 
the last decade (defined as above) Uruguay comes joint first with Venezuela, followed by 
Brazil Argentina and Chile; as for new centa-millionaires, Venezuela ranks first, followed 
by Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and Chile; and for new billionaires, Argentina ranks first, 
                                      
33  For Foucault’s analysis, see especially Foucault (1980); see also Frangie (2008) and Palma 
(2009).  
34  In the Arab world, for example, secularism and the Palestinian issue helped maintain the 
progressive relevance of the left that wanted to concede the economy but still continue to think 
critically (see Frangie, 2008).  
35  It soon became obvious that the ‘third way’ discourse was mostly an attempt to disguise newly-
acquired beliefs as if they were ideas...  
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followed by Brazil, Chile and then Venezuela.36  During this period, in turn, traditionally 
‘right-wing’ Mexico had an increase of people in these three categories which was only 
one-fourth to one-sixth those in the ‘new-left’ countries.37   
As for the Workers’ Party-Brazil, the report estimates that in 2013 one additional 
person became this type of millionaire every 27 minutes — in a country with a practically 
stagnant economy.  In fact, according to the above mentioned report, during the last 
decade (i.e., the two periods of Lula and one of Dilma) dollar millionaires (as above), 
centa-millionaires and billionaires increased by 273%, 274% and 256%, respectively.  
When Cardoso was once asked his opinion of Lula as president, his answer was brief and 
to the point: “He knows how to please the élite”38  At the same time, it took Lula (of all 
people) 5 years as President to make his first visit to a favela.39   
The bottom-line, as Freud reminds us (see epigraph), is that in LA today it is 
again equally true that one should not be so appalled at these kind of events, because it 
was our expectations which were totally out of place: “in reality our fellow-citizens have 
not sunk so low as we feared, because they had never risen so high as we believed”.   
When Keynes said, “people usually prefer to fail through conventional means 
rather than to succeed through unconventional ones”, he could not have guessed just 
how accurately his remarks would define ‘new-left’ governments in office in LA today.  
However, the intellectual poverty (and ideological self-satisfaction) of the ‘new-left’ is 
unlikely to lead to its political death (as many wrongly predicted).  In fact, what is likely 
to happen is almost the opposite, as this very poverty is what makes it so functional to 
the current system of domination and control.   
As it has turned out, both Keynesian-style liberalism and neo-liberalism have 
proved to be de facto counter-cyclical ideologies basically aiming to change the balance 
of power between income groups — each emerging at a different phase of the cycle: 
post-1930s FDR-ism / Keynesianism as a result of the disruptive effects of a crisis-ridden 
                                      
36  Something similar happened in Britain, where a report indicated that the wealth of the richest 
one thousand individuals in the country increased six-fold during the first ten years in office of 
‘New Labour’ — to nearly one trillion dollars (see Financial Times, 29 April 2008).   
37  The Mexican capitalist élite was rather short-sighted (to say the least) when they helped the 
two traditional right-wing parties (the PRI and the PAN) to steal the presidential election from the 
‘new-left’ not once but twice...   
38  Estado de São Paulo, 12 January 2008.  A bit rich coming from a former President who in his 
first period in office bailed out private banks (with no questions asked) at a cost to the public 
sector of $43 billion (see Palma, 2006; this is equivalent to about US$ 60 billion at current prices). 
To this one should add the cost of Cardoso’s re-election; as he needed to change the constitution, 
he spent approximately US$ 44 billion (again about US$ 60 billion at current prices) in subsidies to 
state governments controlled mostly by opposition parties in order to get their support for this 
constitutional change (see Ibid.).  And as the Brazilian government has followed mostly a Ponzi 
finance ever since (i.e., has mostly capitalised the service of that debt), the current value of those 
debts is quite a few times higher.  From this perspective, street demonstrations in Brazil, rather 
than being directed just at the cost of the World Cup (about US11 billion), should have been 
directed rather at other, much more expensive, components of the huge domestic public debt, 
such as the (no-questions-asked) rescue of private banks, or to Cardoso’s ego — probably the 
most expensive in Brazilian political history.  
39  See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7120322.stm. “I was dreaming a wrong 
dream”, was how a leader of the Workers’ Party described his disappointment with Lula’s 
government at the time of his resignation from the Party.  
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unregulated capitalism; post-1980-neo-liberalism as an attempt to return power and 
control to their ‘rightful owners’ (capital).40   
As is so often the case, Hirschman provides a crucial insight into the switch from 
one kind of ‘absolute belief’ to another.  Discussing what he saw as long-term cycles of 
preferences for public versus private provision of goods in the developed world, he 
argued that the post 1980 backlash against Keynesianism and dirigiste policies had a lot 
to do with the stagflation in the 1970s (Hirschman, 1982).  This accelerated a growing 
collective frustration concerning the effectiveness of state regulation and led to radical 
calls for more laissez-faire policies.  He argued that sustained frustration and 
disappointment with existing institutions can lead to extreme “rebound effects” 
demanding radical changes in policy.  Long-term cycles of preferences for public versus 
private provision of goods may be explained by such mechanisms.  For him such 
disappointment must often go through a threshold before it is consciously acknowledged; 
people have a tendency to deny bad choices and stick to them for far too long.  But 
when they do finally admit to their disappointment, it is likely that it would take the form 
of a “rebound effect” — and the longer the denial of bad choices, the stronger the 
“reverse shift”.  In fact, he thinks that "a good portion of the so-called puzzle of 
collective action and participation in public affairs disappears when the rebound effect is 
taken into account" (1982, p. 81).  And few “reverse shifts” (or “rebound effects”) have 
been so pronounced as the one that took place in LA after 1980 — and have led so 
mechanically to exactly the opposite set of policies.  As indicated above, as ideologies 
are so crucial in LA perhaps we have a tendency to deny bad choices and stick to them 
for much longer than most!   
So, perhaps one should not complain so much when the inevitable (and massive) 
‘rebound effect’ comes along.  However, this is hardly an argument for simply (and 
opportunistically) free-riding along them when they come.   
 
Conclusions  
You’ve really got to hand it to the Latin American capitalist elite.  In the 1950s and 
1960s they convinced the progressive forces of the region (all the way up to the 
communist parties) that there was nothing more ‘anti-imperialist’ than to provide them 
with vast rents via ISI; and that these huge rents (as opposed to what was happening in 
East Asia at the time) should be given without any form of performance-related 
conditionality or export-requirements.  And now, in the new century, their process of re-
legitimisation has been so remarkably successful, and their new technologies of power so 
effective, that they have convinced the majority of the left not only that “there is no 
alternative” — and, therefore, ‘nothing left to decide’, and even less to think-critically —, 
                                      
40  Sir Alan Budd, a top UK Treasury civil servant at the time of Mrs. Thatcher’s government, and 
strong supporter of monetarism, explains this rather candidly: “The Thatcher government never 
believed for a moment that [monetarism] was the correct way to bring down inflation.  They did 
however see that this would be a very good way to raise unemployment.  And raising 
unemployment was an extremely desirable way of reducing the strength of the working classes.  
[...] What was engineered – in Marxist terms – was a crisis of capitalism which re-created the 
reserve army of labour, and has allowed the capitalists to make high profits ever since” (quoted in 
Cohen, 2003, p. 13; see also Palma, 2009).   
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but also that they actually deserve every privilege and reward (and, of course, every 
rent and free-lunch) that they can get.  In the case of Chile, for example, with the 
‘Concertación/New Majority’ in its fifth term of office since the return to democracy in 
1990, few question the fact that according to a recent study on tax returns (i.e., not 
counting tax-evasion), the top 1% — including retained profits, but excluding capital 
gains — happily appropriates about one third of national income (32.8%; see López, 
Figueroa and Gutiérrez, 2013).  And all this in a democracy (maybe a low-intensity one, 
but democracy nonetheless), and in one that prides itself for being ‘centre-left’.  Using 
Hirschman’s terminology, now the Latin American new-left’s “tolerance for inequality” 
seems to know no bounds.  In fact, if one looks inside this top 1% it gets even worse: 
the top 0.1% of tax-payers now gets one-fifth of the national income (19.9%), and the 
top 0.01% — corresponding to individuals belonging to just 300 families — gets more 
that one-tenth (11.5%) of the total.41  
Perhaps the greatest irony of them all is that neo-liberalism was originally 
advertised as “the alternative” to the (Roosevelt-Keynesian) “road to serfdom”! (Hayek, 
1944).  For the Guinness Book of Records — section ‘delusional discourse’.   
Chile’s remarkable inequality after more than four decades of uninterrupted neo-
liberal policies — of the ‘authoritarian’ and ‘centre-left’ versions — puts into context 
Hayek’s cheerful vision of the effectiveness of what he calls the “spontaneous order” as 
an engine of history.  For him, this “order”, via its supposedly uniquely effective set of 
incentives, makes it possible to use the knowledge and skills of all members of society in 
a much more efficient way than any possible alternative (Hayek, 1991).  In his analysis 
it follows that any regulation of this “spontaneous order” attempting to interfere with its 
structure of incentives (such as those devised by Roosevelt and Keynes in the 1930s, 
1940s and 1950s, for example), would inevitably constrain entrepreneurship and 
capacity-building of individuals.  Instead, greater freedom of personal endeavours would 
lead to a greater level of progress.  However, following this logic, it is particularly difficult 
to understand the growing inequality of the last 30 years — reflecting how remarkably 
skewed this new “order” is in terms of its distributive outcomes (i.e., how rigged it is 
when it comes to the issue of rewards for efforts and skills).  In fact, now we know only 
too well what neo-liberalism can deliver in terms of income distribution — and they 
indicate that Hayek was not just a bit off the mark in this respect; in fact, he was not 
even close.  The case of Chile’s current appalling inequality is just one fairly illustrative 
case of how the famous ‘invisible hand’ is neither invisible nor even-handed.   
And following Hayek’s logic, it is of course also rather difficult to understand the 
2007-2008 financial crisis — and how it unmasked the self-destructive nature of this 
famous “spontaneous order”, especially when its finances lack the Bretton Woods-type 
regulation.   
Perhaps Hayek (et al.) would have understood better how markets actually work 
in the real world — i.e., how the ‘top 1%’ can rig them when they lack Roosevelt and 
Keynes’-type regulations — had he (and his followers) seen — and understood — that 
famous 1940’s film "My Little Chickadee".  In this film a character, when talking about 
                                      
41   See also Solimano and Pollack (2006) for the remarkable ownership-concentration in the 
Chilean Stock Market.   
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money, states “If a thing is worth having, it's worth cheating for";42 to add the crucial 
line in the film latter: when a man asks him if the card game he is playing [poker] is a 
game of chance, he replies, "Not the way I play it, no.”!  
So, as it has often been the case, rather than from Hayek’s delusional market 
idealisation, what is happening today in LA could be straight out of a García Márquez 
‘magical-realist’ novel: the dominant classes are quite happy to let the dominated ones 
govern, provided that they do not forget who they are.  That is, they finally understood 
Adorno: domination is more effective if it delegates the [...] violence on which it rests to 
the dominated (see epigraph).  For both élites this is a win-win situation: while this 
weird environment has greatly helped the capitalist élite to re-legitimise itself beyond 
their wildest imagination (making it possible for them to regain the necessary power and 
control to accumulate with little ‘market compulsions’ and a minimal need for open 
coercion), it has also greatly helped the managerial left both to regain at least some of 
their lost powers and privileges, and to construct a relatively effective ‘solidarity state’ — 
and military governments have become démodé.   
The key proposition of this paper is that all this is also causally linked to the 
ideological emptiness of the Latin American mainstream left following the ‘post-
doomsday date’ scenario — when LA’s capitalism, far from of collapsing like a house of 
cards (as so obsessively predicted), gained instead a new and powerful lease of life.  The 
failure of the post-Cuban-Revolution “all or nothing”-type political struggle meant that as 
“all” was clearly not possible, many ended up believing that the only viable political 
alternative to “nothing” was an effective agenda of safety-nets.43  When all progressive 
hope had been beaten out of the ‘new-left’, an agenda of ‘safety-nets’ was all what was 
left...    
As their previous analytical work had been characterised by an unremitting critique 
of the economy, once the mainstream left conceded the economy as the fundamental 
hub of the struggle, there was little else left in terms of basic ideological principles to 
hold onto in a thoughtful way.  Basically, they must have felt that by ‘surrendering the 
economy’, they lost not just some but all their progressive ideological relevance.   
From this point of view, the problem with many ‘dependentistas’ was not just 
related to how factual matters were increasingly revealing their internal analytical 
inconsistencies; it was also about the emotional energy that most of them had invested 
in the idea that peripheral capitalism was about to collapse, and the symbolic meaning 
that they began to attach to the almost ‘inevitable’ arrival of socialism in the region.  Not 
surprisingly, many threw in the towel after the predicted doomsday date had passed.  
Worse still, some not only lost their previous absolute certainties, but moved from one 
type of absolute beliefs/certainties to another type of absolute beliefs/certainties —
perhaps simply not to lose their balance, they held on to their previous development 
                                      
42  Voltaire once said “It is forbidden to kill; therefore all murderers are punished unless they kill in 
large numbers [...].  In terms of global financial markets, the current version of this idea is “It is 
forbidden to commit fraud; therefore all fraudsters are punished unless they commit fraud on a 
large scale.   
43  Some people still think that in Venezuela or Argentina something radically different is supposed 
to be happening, but so far in both cases the most effective achievement is also an agenda of 
safety-nets — this wasn’t the way things were supposed to play out!  For an analysis of Venezuela, 
see DiJohn (2008).  
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strategies and policies, but in their exact opposite version.  In the meantime, the world 
moves on, and Asia forges ahead!  That is, an important part of the Latin American left 
was simply seduced by the next available (ideological) religion — ‘TINA’.  The end result 
of all of this, as Chomsky has argued, is that ‘progressive intellectuals’ have ended up as 
the guardians at the gates of the orthodoxy.44  
What we have today in LA is the combination of an insatiable capitalist elite, a 
captured and unimaginative ‘progressive’ political élite, passive citizens, and a stalled 
social imagination.  One could add that we also have a bunch of neo-comrades who (as 
Ortega y Gasset analysed as a regional trait) are rather pleased with themselves.  Only a 
few ‘critical doctrinaires’ whine – particularly from their comfortable tenured positions in 
universities far away!  Why can these “anticapitalistas trasnochados” (stale anti-
capitalists) not understand that life is so much simpler when one succeeds in 
transforming ‘delving deeply into the surface of things’ into an art form?   
In short, was President Lula right when he suggested that the emergence of the 
‘new left’ in Brazil was just “a positive sign in the evolution of the human species,” or is 
Francisco de Oliveira right when he claims that the ‘new left’ in Brazil (and in the rest of 
LA) is like the platypus, a creature that violates evolutionary theories and yet still exists, 
and is likely to continue, despite the fact that it is at an evolutionary dead-end?45   
By being able to convince so many in LA that any progressive alternative agenda 
today is just a suicide pact maybe the ‘new left’ has actually become the most effective 
enemy of any true progressive struggle.  Being perfect magicians, no one but they are 
supposed to know the necessary tricks for making conflict evaporate, coercion conceal 
itself, and military regimes become obsolete.  Now, for how long will they be able to 
tame ‘the dangerous classes’?  For how long will they be able to keep getting such a 
bang for the few bucks they give to the very poor?  And for how long will they be able to 
keep subjective violence in check, while being the very agents of the structural violence 
that creates the conditions for this violence?46  
I do not think it would be an exaggeration to say that no other event in peacetime 
LA has succeeded in achieving such a powerful ‘rebound effect’ as the advent of this all-
powerful and remarkably tyrannical neo-liberal ideology — nor has any other been able 
to succeed in constructing such a dominant power structure; one with the same 
remarkable capabilities for politically-debilitating the majority of the population 
(especially the ‘dangerous classes’ and the progressive intelligentsia) via heightening 
risks and insecurities, as for generating such attractive personal and political rent-
seeking opportunities for so many in the left — as well as for those in their ‘intellectual 
periphery’ — who are prepared to acquiesce.   
Such powerful sticks and seductive carrots, combined with the (mistaken) 
conviction that due to events at home and abroad progressive ideas have lost all their 
ideological relevance, proved to be a lethal ideological cocktail for the left.  As a result, 
                                      
44  http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/18257. 
45  For Lula’s speech, see above quote in FOLHAONLINE 2 May 2008; and for Oliveira, see (2003).  
The platypus is a semi-aquatic mammal (found in Eastern Australia) that still lays eggs and suckles 
its young. 
46  On this issue, see especially Žižek (2008).  
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not only did progressive change come off the political agenda of the ‘official’ left, but also 
(as mentioned above) LA’s mainstream socialism mutated from a ‘dangerous movement’ 
to becoming the capitalist elite’s best friend.  In this process the dominant classes are 
only too happy to let the dominated ones govern, provided that they do not forget who 
they are; as a result, the Latin American critical tradition in the social sciences has 
become practically extinct — and with it, the region’s social imagination has virtually 
stalled.  
What happens today in post-structuralism and post-dependency-LA shows (yet 
again) that many intellectuals, especially when working without a proper social and 
political base, can be fickle and can easily turn for the next set of fashionable beliefs on 
their horizon to continue with their preferred business: providing a worldview and a 
theoretical legitimacy to it.  
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Appendix 1: Structuralism 
The main root of Latin American structuralism was French economic structuralism (see 
Blankenburg, Palma and Tregenna 2008). Perroux (1939), for example, who was the 
main intellectual influence in Furtado’s early work, including his doctoral dissertation at 
the Sorbonne, defined ‘structural economics’ as the science of the relations characteristic 
of an economic system (ensemble) situated in time and space.  Central to this approach 
was the view that, over and above the ‘givens’ of neoclassical economics (preferences, 
resources and technology), the analysis of the evolution of institutions and structures 
over time had to be at the heart of economic analysis.  One of the innovative 
contributions of Perroux concerns his theory of “domination”, which became central to 
ECLAC’s conception of economic systems: rather than being constituted by relationships 
between equals, the economic world was conceptualised in terms of hidden or explicit 
relationships of force and power between dominant and dominated entities. 
From the very beginning ECLAC’s analysis was structuralist in the sense that it 
viewed the world economy as a system within which the centre and the periphery were 
intrinsically related, and that most economic problems of the periphery, such as slow 
productivity growth, stop-go macroeconomics, inflation, and unemployment were 
associated to the specific economic structure that emerged from that interaction — one 
that was characterised mostly by a weak manufacturing sector and a backward 
agriculture for the domestic market.  ECLAC’s analysis was also structuralist in the sense 
that it tried to focus on underlying structures and relationships, as opposed to 
epiphenomena.  
The hub on which the whole of ECLAC’s analysis of underdevelopment turned was 
the idea that the structure of production in the centre and in the periphery differed 
substantially.  That of the centre was seen as homogeneous and diversified; that of the 
periphery, in contrast, as heterogeneous and specialised.  Heterogeneous because 
economic activities with significant differences in productivity existed side by side, with 
the two extremes provided by a ‘modern’ export sector, and a subsistence agriculture.  
Specialised because the export sector, which is concentrated upon a few unprocessed 
primary products, represented a high proportion of GDP and had very limited backward 
and forward linkages with the rest of the economy.  It was this structural difference that 
lay behind the different function of each pole in the international division of labour; and 
within this framework there were few (if any) endogenous forces in the periphery that 
might have led its structure of production in time to become more homogenous and 
diversified — i.e., one with both a more dynamic manufacturing sector, and a more 
vibrant domestic agriculture.47  Thus the interrelationship between centre and periphery 
could not be understood in static terms since it was part of a single system, dynamic by 
its very nature.48  
                                      
47  Perhaps influenced by previous Keynesian analysis of inflation in India, inelastic supplies of 
agricultural wage-goods were at the core of ECLAC’s theory of inflation.  See Noyola (1957); 
Sunkel (1960); Seers (1962); and Pinto (1968).  
48  For a comprehensive analysis of structuralism, see Rodríguez (2006), and the corresponding 
chapter in this Handbook; for ‘dependency analyses’, see Palma (1978).  See also, Blankenburg, 
Palma and Tregenna (2008); Cardoso (1974); Cardoso and Faletto (1979); ECLAC (1963); Furtado 
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The nucleus of ECLAC analysis was the critique of the conventional theory of 
international trade — as expressed in the Heckscher–Ohlin version of Ricardo’s theory of 
comparative advantages.  It aimed to show that the international division of labour 
which conventional theory claimed to be ‘naturally’ produced by comparative advantages 
was of much greater benefit to the industrial centre than to the commodity-exporting 
periphery — i.e., in these matters, the ‘invisible hand’ was neither invisible nor even-
handed!49  From this starting point, ECLAC analyses three structural tendencies which 
are considered inherent to the development of the periphery: unemployment, external 
disequilibrium, and the tendency to deterioration of the terms of trade (see especially 
Rodríguez, 2006).   
i).-  Due to structural heterogeneity, ECLAC argued that full employment of the 
labour force could only be achieved if the rate of capital accumulation in the modern 
sector was sufficient not only to absorb the growth of the active population, but also to 
reabsorb labour displaced from the traditional sector.  It is from this heavy burden on 
the modern sector that the structural tendency towards unemployment was originally 
deduced.   
ii).-  As the structure of production in the periphery was excessively specialised, a 
substantial proportion of the demand for manufactured products had to be oriented 
towards imports; and given their high income elasticity, imports would tend to grow 
much faster than national income.  The opposite was the case in the centre vis-à-vis its 
imports from the periphery, as these consisted essentially of unprocessed primary 
products, for which income elasticity is usually less than unity.  Therefore, the growth of 
income in the periphery that is sustainable from its balance of payments point of view 
would inevitably be one that is lower than that of the centre (at least in the medium-
term) — and one that is lower in proportion to the degree of the disparity between the 
respective income elasticities of demand for imports.  If the periphery attempted to 
surpass this limit, it would expose itself to external disequilibrium, stop-go 
macroeconomics and increasing foreign indebtedness.  Thus (given its consumption 
preferences), the only long-term alternative to slow growth and an ever-increasing 
foreign debt would be a greater effort to satisfy the highly income-elastic demand for 
manufactured products with domestic production, and to try to diversify exports towards 
more income-elastic products (à-la-East Asia).50  In turn, domestic production of these 
types of goods should set in motion a growth-enhancing process of cumulative 
causation.  Only a proper process of industrialisation, and of modernisation of 
agriculture, given these assumptions, could enable the periphery to enjoy a fast (and 
sustainable) rate of growth of real income, and one that was not so highly constrained 
by its higher income elasticities of demand for imports.  
                                                                                                                      
(1970); Palma (2008a); and Taylor (2004).  
49  For ECLAC, Ricardian international comparative advantages mostly opened up attractive 
opportunities to technologically-advanced economies — something that they were quite happy 
exploit (see also Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009a).   
50  The irony, of course, is that while many in East Asia were actually doing this almost by instinct 
(following the example of Japan), in LA there was an ever increasing amount of debates and 
analyses about the necessity of doing this — but little ‘compulsion’ for their domestic industrial 
bourgeoisies to actually do something about it!   
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iii).-  Finally, for ECLAC the tendency towards deteriorating terms of trade, and 
the asymmetries in terms of gains from specialisation which it brings with it, are a logical 
analytical deduction from the phenomena of specialisation and heterogeneity.  The basic 
problem is the effect of economic growth on the terms of trade.  Following the issues 
discussed above, as the periphery grew both its consumption and the production paths 
were (and are today even more) biased towards trade (see Palma, 2008a).  That is, as 
incomes grew there was a trend for the proportion of importables in total consumption to 
increase; and as output grew, the same was the case for the proportion of exportables in 
domestic production.  However, in the centre both the consumption and the production 
paths would tend to be less biased for trade vis-à-vis the periphery; in the case of the 
former, low price and low income elasticities for most primary products would be the 
main reasons, and in the latter, phenomenon such as economies of scale would tend to 
reduce the primary-commodity content in final output.  
As both the consumption, and the production paths of the centre would tend to be 
less biased for trade vis-à-vis the periphery — the consumption one due to low price and 
low income elasticities for most primary products, and the production one due mostly to 
economies of scale reducing the primary-commodity content in final output.  The 
combined effects of both trends would be a tendency towards a systemic overproduction 
of primary products.  Hence the tendency towards deterioration of the terms of trade of 
the periphery.   
A further component of this phenomenon of asymmetries in terms of gains from 
specialisation was the fact that the periphery exported ‘homogeneous’ products 
(commodities that are normally sold in spot-markets), while the centre exported 
‘heterogeneous’ ones — from which all sort of rents could be extracted both in the 
product, and in the factor markets.  
In sum, the key idea of structuralism was that supply curves in the periphery had 
the ‘wrong elasticities’: they were highly-elastic where this was not necessarily to its 
advantage (commodity-exports), and they were inelastic where high-elasticities would 
have been greatly beneficial for sustainable growth and low inflation (manufacturing and 
agricultural production of wage-goods).51   
However, according to ECLAC — and as opposed to the current gloom of the 
“resource curse” brigade, and of so many related ‘pessimistic’ hypotheses — commodity-
rich countries could escape from these asymmetries through a process of structural 
transformation of their economies.  The central element in this was a process of 
industrialisation, which would require a faster rate of accumulation, higher domestic 
production of income-elastic importables, and (eventually) more income and price elastic 
exportables.  But this process could not be expected to take place spontaneously, for it 
would be inhibited by both the international division of labour which the centre would 
                                      
51  Many have misunderstood this, arguing that structuralism was just about the latter part of the 
asymmetry — i.e., just about ‘supply-inelasticities’.  Furthermore, as the typical narrowness of 
mainstream economics could only let those working from this approach see policy mistakes as the 
cause of these inelasticities, a critique of structuralism from this perspective inevitably argued that 
although structuralists were able to identify some of the key growth-constraints of the periphery, 
they were greatly mistaken in their policy recommendations.  See for example Little (1984).  
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attempt to impose, and by a series of structural obstacles internal to the peripheral 
economies.  Consequently, what was needed were both a process of vigorous state-led 
industrialisation, and a rapid modernisation of non-export agriculture (by, for example, a 
process of land redistribution).  
 
Appendix 2: The Analytics of Dependency Studies 
The general focus of all ‘dependency' analyses is the study of the (supposed intractable) 
obstacles to capitalist development in the periphery from the point of view of the 
interplay between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ structures.  However, this interplay was 
analysed in several different ways.  With the necessary degree of simplification that 
every classification of intellectual tendencies entails, I would distinguish between three 
major approaches in dependency analysis (not mutually exclusive from the point of view 
of their intellectual history).  First is the approach begun by Baran, Sweezy and Frank; 
its essential characteristic being that dependency was seen as causally linked to 
permanent capitalist underdevelopment (see Baran, 1957; Baran and Sweezy, 1966; 
and Frank, 1967).  The second approach is associated with one branch of the ECLAC 
Structuralist School, especially Furtado, Pinto and Sunkel.  These writers sought to 
reformulate the classical ECLAC analysis from the perspective of a critique of the 
obstacles to ‘national’ development (see ECLAC, 1963).  The third and final approach, 
tried (but seldom succeeded) in explicitly avoiding the formulation of mechanico-formal 
theories of underdevelopment based on its ‘dependent’ character, concentrating instead 
on what was called the study of ‘concrete situations of dependency’.  In the words of 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso:  
The question which we should ask ourselves is why, it being obvious that the 
capitalist economy tends towards a growing internationalisation, that societies are 
divided into antagonistic classes, and that the particular is to a certain extent 
conditioned by the general, with those premises we have not gone beyond the 
partial – and therefore abstract in the Marxist sense – characterisation of the Latin 
American situation and historical process.  (1974, pp. 326-7, my translation). 
 
i).-  Dependency as a theory of the inevitability of capitalist under-
development  
The ‘father’ of this approach to ‘dependency’ was unquestionably Paul Baran.  His 
principal contribution (1957) took up the view of the Sixth Congress of the COMINTERN 
regarding the supposedly irresolvable nature of the contradictions between the economic 
and political needs of imperialism and those of the process of industrialisation and 
development of the periphery.  To defend its interests, international monopoly capital 
would form successful alliances with pre-capitalist domestic oligarchies intended to block 
progressive capitalist transformation in order to have continuous easy access to cheap 
peripheral resources.  The traditional elites, in turn, would be able to maintain traditional 
modes of surplus extraction and monopoly on power.  Within this context the possibilities 
for economic growth were extremely limited, as the surplus was largely expropriated by 
foreign capital, or otherwise squandered by traditional oligarchies.  The only way out was 
political.  At a very premature stage, capitalism — as it had actually evolved in the 
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periphery — had become a fetter on the development of the productive forces and, 
therefore, its historical role had been successfully blocked, and had already come to an 
early end.  
Baran developed his ideas influenced both by the Frankfurt School’s general 
pessimism regarding the nature of capitalist development and by Sweezy’s proposition 
(following Habermas, and Joan Robinson) that the rise of monopolies imparts to 
capitalism a tendency towards stagnation and decay.  He also followed the main growth 
paradigm of his time, the Harrod-Domar theory, which held that the size of the 
investable surplus was the crucial determinant of growth (together with the efficiency 
with which it was used — i.e., the incremental capital-output ratio).   
Starting out with Baran’s analysis, Frank attempted to prove the thesis that the 
only solution was a revolution of an immediately socialist character.  For our purposes 
we may identify three levels of analysis in Frank’s model of the ‘development of 
underdevelopment’.  In the first (arguing against ‘dualistic' models), he attempted to 
demonstrate (quite successfully) that the periphery had been integrated into the world 
economy since colonial rule.  In the second, he attempted to show (this time quite 
unsuccessfully) that such incorporation had transformed the countries in question 
immediately into capitalist economies.  Finally, Frank tried to prove that this integration 
was achieved through an interminable metropolis-satellite chain, through which the 
surplus generated at each stage was successfully siphoned off towards the centre (see 
Frank, 1967).   
 However, Frank never even bothered to define what he meant by ‘capitalism’; he 
simply affirmed that, since the periphery was never ‘feudal’, and since it had always 
been incorporated into the world capitalist system, then it must follow that it had been 
‘capitalist’ from the beginning of colonial times.  It is not surprising, then, that this 
analysis leads Frank to displace class relations from the centre of his analysis.  Although 
it is evident that capitalism is a system where production for profits via exchange 
predominates, the opposite is not necessarily true: the existence of production for profits 
in the market is not proof of the existence of capitalist relations of production.  For 
Frank, it is a sufficient condition; thus he develops a circular concept of capitalism.  In 
turn, for him it is capitalism (and nothing else but capitalism), with its metropolis-
satellite relations of exploitation, which has produced underdevelopment.  The choice 
was clear: continuing endlessly to under-develop within this emasculated capitalism, or 
an immediate move towards a socialist revolution.  Under these circumstances, “[...] to 
support the bourgeoisie in its already played-out role on the stage of history is 
treacherous [...].” (1967, p. xvii).  
 As mentioned above, in my opinion the real value of Frank’s analysis is his 
critique of the supposedly dual structure of peripheral societies.  Frank shows 
convincingly that the different sectors of the economies in question are, and have been 
since early in their colonial history, in one way or another linked to the world economy.  
Moreover, he has correctly emphasised that this integration into the world economy has 
not automatically brought about economic progress, as would have been predicted by 
‘optimistic’ models — derived from Adam Smith and early works of Marx (such as those 
on India) — in which such integration would inevitably set in motion a process of 
capitalist transformation, including increased division of labour and sustained 
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productivity growth.52  Nevertheless, Frank’s error (shared by the whole tradition of 
which he is part, including Sweezy and Amin) lies in his attempt to explain this 
phenomenon by using the same economic deterministic framework of the model he 
purports to transcend.  In fact, he merely turns it upside-down: the development of the 
‘core’ necessarily requires the underdevelopment of the periphery — and somehow the 
former would always manage to succeed in its objectives.53  
Basically, I would argue that the theories of dependency examined here are 
mistaken not only because they do not ‘fit the facts’ — as capitalism was certainly 
developing LA’s forces of production at the time (see below) —, but also because their 
mechanico-formal nature renders them both static and ahistorical.  Their analytical focus 
has not been directed to the understanding of how new forms of capitalist development 
have been marked by a series of specific economic, political, and social contradictions.  
Instead they are directed only to asserting the claim that capitalism had lost, or in fact 
never had, a historically progressive role in the periphery in all times and places.  
Regarding ‘fitting the facts’, as mentioned above, while the authors discussed 
above were busy writing about the intrinsic incapacity of peripheral-type capitalism to 
develop the productive forces in LA, productivity per hour worked was growing at a rate 
that had no precedent in the region, and has had no continuity ever since.  
 
ii).-  Dependency as a reformulation of ECLAC’s structuralist analysis  
Towards the middle of the 1960s ECLAC’s structuralist approach suffered a gradual 
decline.  The process of import-substituting industrialisation (ISI), although delivering 
productivity growth and industrialisation, seemed to aggravate other problems (instead 
of alleviating them), such as those of the balance-of-payments.  Income distribution was 
also worsening in several countries (especially Brazil).  The problem of unemployment 
was also growing more acute, in particular as a result of increased rural-urban migration 
(due to the failure of domestic agriculture to modernise).  And industrial production was 
becoming increasingly concentrated in products typically consumed by the elites, and 
                                      
52  In his article on the ‘Future Results of British Rule in India’ (1853), Marx argues that English 
imperialism will not be able to avoid the industrialisation of India: “when you have once introduced 
machinery into the locomotion of a country which possesses iron and coal you are unable to 
withhold it from its fabrications”.  Kierman is probably right when he states that “So far as can be 
seen, what he [Marx] had in mind was not a further spread of Western imperialism, but a 
proliferation of autonomous capitalism, such as he expected in India and did witness in North 
America” (1967, p. 183).  For a discussion of this issue, see Palma (1978).  An important issue to 
keep in mind in order to understand, at least in part, the differences between Marx writings on 
India (1850s) and those of many ‘dependentistas’ on LA (1960s) is the divergence in terms of 
technological paradigms in each period.  See especially Pérez (2002) for an illuminating analysis of 
how each of these two technological paradigms opened up totally different options for capitalist 
development in the periphery.    
53  Although Frank did not go very far in his analysis of the world capitalist system as a whole, of 
its origins and its development, Wallerstein tackled this challenge in two remarkable books (1974 
and 1980).  The central concerns of Frank are analysed in many works; among those not already 
quoted, see Kay (2011); and Palma (2008c).  The most thoroughgoing critiques have come from 
Laclau, Cardoso, Lall, Warren, Brenner, and Palma. 
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was not having enough ‘ripple effect’ upon other productive sectors, and not many 
manufactures were exported (see Furtado, 1970).  
Also, ISI developed an anti-learning bias; most Latin American manufacturing 
firms had contracts with foreign companies in which they imported the technology but 
could not change anything; and whenever possible, machinery and parts also had to be 
imported.  Brazil may have already produced a million cars in the early 1970s, but there 
was no Hyundai in sight!  Basically, rigid protection and relatively small domestic 
markets produced incentives towards horizontal diversification; there were more rewards 
from developing new products than from improving the productivity of what was already 
developed.  In this sense, ISI had not really developed an ‘infant industry’ rationale in 
the sense that its logic was not one of temporary protection to help firms get to the 
frontier and become internationally competitive.  In this sense, there was a ‘double 
play’; the manufacturing industry that emerged from ISI was relatively fragile (which 
would make it very difficult later for it to adjust to the new post-1980 paradigm), but 
what was being developed around ISI proved to be growth-enhancing in the long run 
(see especially Pérez, 2008).  
This apparently gloomy panorama led to substantial ideological changes among 
many influential ECLAC thinkers, and it strengthened the convictions of the ‘dependency’ 
writers reviewed earlier.  The former were faced with the problem of trying to explain 
some of the unexpected consequences of their policies; the latter tried to deny with the 
greatest possible vehemence the possibility of any type of dependent capitalist 
development.   
Also, by making a basically ethical distinction between ‘growth’ and 
‘development’, ECLAC’s dependency analysis followed two separate lines, one concerned 
with the obstacles to economic growth, and the other concerned with the perverse 
character taken by local ‘development’.  As suggested before, the fragility of this 
formulation lies in its inability to distinguish between a socialist critique of capitalism and 
the analysis of the actual obstacles to capitalist development.  
 
iii).-  Dependency as a methodology for the analysis of concrete situations 
of development  
Briefly, this third approach can be summarised as follows.  First, in common with the two 
other approaches, this one sees LA as an integral part of the world capitalist system, in 
the context of the increasing internationalisation of the system.  It also argues that some 
of the central dynamics of that system lie outside the peripheral economies and that the 
options open to them are, to a certain extent, limited by the development of the system 
at the centre.  In this way the ‘particular’, to some extent, is inevitably conditioned by 
the ‘general’.  Therefore, a basic element for the analysis of these societies is given by 
the understanding of the ‘general determinants’ of the world capitalist system and of its 
different processes of globalisation — which have themselves changed rapidly.  The 
analysis therefore requires an understanding of the contemporary political and economic 
characteristics of the world capitalist system, and of the dynamics of its transformation.  
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Thus, for example, this approach was quick to grasp the significance of the rise of 
the multinational corporations in the 1960s, which was progressively transforming 
centre-periphery relationships.  As foreign capital became increasingly directed towards 
manufacturing industry in the periphery, the struggle for industrialisation, which was 
previously seen as an anti-imperialist struggle, at least in some cases became the goal of 
foreign capital.  Thus dependency and industrialisation ceased to be necessarily 
contradictory processes, and a path of ‘dependent development’ became clearly possible. 
Second, this third approach tried to enrich the analysis of how developing 
societies are structured through unequal and antagonistic patterns of social organisation, 
showing the asymmetries and the exploitative character of the system, and their 
relationship with the socio-economic base.  This approach has also given importance to 
the diversity of natural resources, geographic location and so on, thus also extending the 
analysis of the ‘internal determinants’ of capitalist development. 
However, — thirdly — while these characteristics are important, the most 
significant feature of this approach is that it attempted to go beyond these elements, 
and insisted that from the premises so far outlined one arrives only at a partial, abstract 
and indeterminate characterisation of the historical process in the periphery, which can 
only be overcome by understanding how the ‘general’ and ‘specific’ determinants interact 
in particular and concrete situations.  It is only by understanding the specificity of 
‘movement’ and change in the peripheral societies as a dialectical unity of both these 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors that one can hope to understand the particularity of 
social, political and economic processes in these societies. 
Only in this way can one explain how, for example, the same process of 
mercantile expansion could simultaneously produce systems of slave labour, systems 
based on other forms of exploitation of indigenous populations, and incipient forms of 
wage labour.  What is important is not simply to show that mercantile expansion was the 
basis of the transformation of most of the periphery, and even less to deduce 
mechanically that that process made these countries immediately capitalist.  Rather, this 
approach emphasises the specificity of history and seeks to avoid vague and abstract 
concepts by demonstrating how, throughout the history of backward nations, different 
sectors of local classes allied themselves or clashed with foreign interests, organised the 
state in different forms, sustained distinct ideologies, or tried to implement various 
policies or defined alternative strategies to cope with imperialist challenges in diverse 
moments of history. 
The study of the dynamic of dependent societies as a dialectical unity of internal 
and external factors implies that the conditioning effect of each on the development of 
these societies can be separated only by undertaking a static analysis that would have to 
separate almost metaphysically the two sides of the opposition.  Equally, if the internal 
dynamic of the dependent society is a particular aspect of the general dynamic of the 
capitalist system, it does not imply that the latter produces concrete effects in the 
former, but only that it finds concrete expression in that internal dynamic.  The system 
of ‘external domination’ reappears as an ‘internal phenomenon’ through the social 
practices of local groups and classes, who share the interests and values of external 
forces.  Other internal groups and forces oppose this domination, and in the concrete 
development of these contradictions the specific dynamic of the society is thus 
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generated.  It is not a case of seeing one part of the world capitalist system as 
‘developing’ and another as ‘under-developing’, or of seeing imperialism and dependency 
as two sides of the same coin, with the dependent world reduced to a passive role.  
Instead, in the words of Cardoso and Faletto,  
We conceive the relationship between external and internal forces as forming a 
complex whole whose structural links are not based on mere external forms of 
exploitation and coercion, but are rooted in coincidences of interest between local 
dominant classes and international ones, and, on the other hand, are challenged by 
local dominated groups and classes.  In some circumstances, the networks of 
coincident or reconciliated interests might expand to include segments of the middle 
class, if not even of alienated parts of working classes.  In other circumstances, 
segments of dominant classes might seek internal alliance with middle classes, 
working classes, and even peasants, aiming to protect themselves from foreign 
penetration that contradicts their interests. (1979, pp. 10-11).  
 
There are, of course, elements within the capitalist system that affect all developing 
economies (DCs), but it is precisely the diversity within this unity that characterises 
historical processes.  Thus the analytical focus should be oriented towards the 
elaboration of concepts capable of explaining how the general trends in capitalist 
expansion are transformed into specific relationships between individuals, classes and 
states, how these specific relations in turn react back upon the general trends of the 
capitalist system, how internal and external processes of political domination reflect one 
another, both in their compatibilities and their contradictions, how the economies and 
polities of peripheral countries are articulated with those of the centre, and how their 
specific dynamics are thus generated.  
However, as is obvious, it is not at all clear why this third approach to the 
analysis of peripheral capitalism should be restricted to — or even labelled as — 
dependency analyses; so (fortunately) it has outlived their demise.   
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